

Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.



and Army Intelligence Doctrine

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I have reserved the story of Phillip B. Davidson, Jr. as one of the last in this field of military intelligence greats because his career connects World War II and the mid-20th century with the turn of the 21st century, a time when the military intelligence branch finds itself the second largest branch in the U.S. Army. Since he typifies the MI leader as visionary and teacher, his career is a fitting conclusion to this collection of biographical essays which began some 240 years before his death with George Washington giving advice on the importance of intelligence, saw Arthur Wagner stressing the need for professional military education at the turn of the last century, and witnessed a succession of intelligence leaders who concerned themselves with passing down their singular big truth: "Intelligence is for Commanders."

When a young friend destined for the U.S. Military Academy broke his arm cranking a Model T Ford, a slot opened up for alternate Phillip B. Davidson, Jr. and embarked him on a 35-year military career that bracketed three wars. His assignment to intelligence work was just as capricious. As he tells it in his memoirs, after he graduated from the Command and General Staff College, a faculty member called him in to offer him a job as an instructor in the intelligence department, only to find out that he had misread his note to Davidson instead of Mike Davison. The deputy director of the Intelligence Division of the school said, "You'll do just as well." We do not know if the other man, Mike Davison, could have done better, but he did go on to be a four-star general.¹

The intelligence specialists were getting their training across the state at Fort Riley's Ground Combat School from an Intelligence Department headed up by Col. Oscar W. Koch. The Army's future leaders, on the other hand, would get their intelligence familiarization at the Command and General Staff College. It was while teaching at the Command and General Staff College that Davidson co-authored with Robert R. Glass² a seminal book entitled *Intelligence is for Commanders*. Both men had commanded armored units in the European theater during World War II, so they could well appreciate the thesis encapsulated in the title of their jointly produced volume. Davidson had been a squadron commander and regimental executive officer in the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Group (Mechanized) in George Patton's Third Army. In his memoirs he neglects to mention that, for his valorous actions, he was awarded the Silver Star, Bronze Star and Purple Heart.

In the introduction to the book, published in 1948, the authors make clear that they are writing the book predominantly for commanders who must understand the intelligence system and its fallibilities if they are to be effective at the art of command. "Intelligence is not an academic exercise or an end in itself," they point out. "The prime purpose of intelligence is to help the commander make a decision, and thereby to proceed more accurately and more confidently with the accomplishment of his mission. This thought is the keynote of tactical intelligence."

Davidson and Glass called attention to the fact that the commanders in the war they just fought were not "intelligence conscious," and, in some cases, were contemptuous of what intelligence could offer them. They wanted to convey what they thought was the most important lesson of the war. "Only by understanding the principles and procedures of intelligence can a commander realize the full ex-

ment of the assistance he should receive from competent intelligence officers and agencies in the accomplishment of his mission.” They pointed out the necessity for the intelligence officer to “‘sell’ intelligence to the commanders and to everybody else in the unit.”³ These now seemingly self-evident observations became the kernels around which U.S. Army doctrine would coalesce during the next 40 years and would ripen among intelligence thinkers four decades later.⁴

He may not have intended to become an intelligence officer, but his next assignment confirmed his abilities to perform these duties. In 1948 he became chief, Plans and Estimates Branch, in Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s G2 section, GHQ FEC, and held this position throughout the Korean War. Davidson was charged with sifting “through the myriad and conflicting intelligence reports, to make some coherent picture from them, and to alert our superiors to the capabilities, potentialities and intentions of possible enemies of the United States in eastern Asia.” He called this experience of working in high-level and complex intelligence operations a “rare learning experience” but conceded that he “probably learned more from the mistakes...than from things that were done well.”⁵ He earned the Legion of Merit for his efforts there.

It was on his watch that the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950 caught the U.S. off guard. Looking back at what critics have called an intelligence failure, Davidson furnished his causes for the surprise:

GHQ/FEC was not receiving enough “hard intelligence” to make valid judgments of North Korean potentialities and intentions. In 1950 the entire American mechanism for the collection and evaluation of intelligence on Korea was in limbo. CIA was titularly responsible, and while Korea was not an official charge of the FEC, events in that country were important to General MacArthur’s mission in Japan and elsewhere. As a result the FEC kept half an eye on Korea and collected intelligence on and in Korea as a distinctly secondary effort. Nor did the South Koreans contribute anything. Their intelligence effort and product were puerile, tainted by internal politics, and thus, distrusted.⁶

He also pointed to the “torrent of irrelevant, misleading, and useless information” that distorts the true picture, and the “cry wolf” syndrome which was operating on the peninsula with the constant North Korean border incursions and artillery bombardments. As a final factor, he described the gauntlet of psychological and organizational hurdles the analyst must run before his estimate is accepted.⁷

A junior estimator has to “sell” his prophesy to a string of senior colonels and generals before it can get out of the headquarters. Each of these men has not only veto power over the prophesy, but his own psychological blocks, biases, and ambitions, all of which will weigh on his judgment and mental courage. The truth is that only the most undeniable evidence of an impending war will survive that gauntlet and reach public pronouncement. In the case of the Korean War, this undeniable evidence was simply not there—at least, not before the event. It is always there in retrospection.⁸

Hard on the heels of the first surprise was a second one, the Chinese intervention in October and November 1950. Davidson felt that MacArthur’s GHQ/FEC got a “bum rap” when the blame for the Chinese entry into the war was blamed on them. The intelligence section had no information at all on the Chinese forces. Diplomatic signals were never passed along to Tokyo.

From 1952 to 1953, Davidson taught history at West Point as an associate professor and in 1954 attended the Army War College. He subsequently served in the European Command, graduated from the National War College, and worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in jobs not related to intelligence. In 1963 he took command of the U.S. Army Security Agency School and Training Center

at Fort Devens, which trained specialists in signal intelligence. He next was the deputy commanding general of the Army training center at Fort Dix, NJ.

In 1965 he was G2, U.S. Army, Pacific, at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, a job he discovered had little to do with the war being fought in Vietnam. He tried to change that by sending almost 100 people from his intelligence resources in Hawaii to Vietnam on periods of three to six months for temporary duty. This brought some relief to Maj. Gen. Joseph McChristian, the MACV J2, who was struggling to bring the intelligence apparatus up to speed. In 1967 Davidson abandoned the role of distant onlooker and flew to Vietnam to become the J2, Military Assistance Command, on 1 June, and begin his service in his third war.

He only had a one-week overlap with McChristian, an amount of time he found grossly inadequate to prepare himself for the job. Realizing that this could have potentially disastrous effects in a war where the enemy held the strategic initiative, he made sure his successor would have a three-month transitional period when he departed.

He contrasted his approach to that of his predecessor, Maj. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, noting that what is wanted in one stage of a war or campaign is not necessarily what will be needed in another. McChristian set forth his philosophy in his book, *Military Intelligence*, when he declared: "The intelligence officer must be conservative and unshakable in letting facts speak. Rationalization and crystal ball gazing invite disaster. One either knows the facts or one does not."⁹ Davidson, on the other hand, was willing to court the disaster implicit in predicting the future so that he could better serve his commander. He explained:

Unfortunately, this total reliance on facts makes intelligence largely an historical exercise. Most commanders want and certainly need more than history. Eternally, they want to know, "What the hell is the enemy going to do?" My philosophy began with Joe's insistence on facts and then went beyond that into using these facts to foretell future enemy trends and plans. Sometimes the intelligence facts upon which to forecast future enemy operations were inadequate. If so, I made no predictions. This was, however, seldom the case. My *modus operandi* was obviously riskier than Joe's, but if well done, it would produce much greater rewards for the commander.¹⁰

With the encouragement of his boss, Creighton Abrams, Davidson was determined to revise the intelligence process by furnishing projections of enemy intentions. He did this largely by adding to his staff two top-notch intelligence estimators. He explained:

One was a senior colonel, Charles A. Morris, who had fought in World War II as an infantryman, and had gone into the intelligence game after that conflict. He was rock-solid and unflappable, with a bold and incisive mind. He had served a previous tour in Vietnam and knew the country and the enemy. The other was a young colonel, Daniel O. Graham. He was a West Point graduate and a career intelligence estimator. He had imagination, initiative, and a quick, free-ranging mind. Both men wrote and spoke well; both had the courage of their beliefs and no reluctance to state them. They had both worked for me in ARPAC (U.S. Army, Pacific), so I knew their worth and potential. The three of us became the MACV intelligence estimators.¹¹

A lesson Davidson had apparently learned from Charles Willoughby in Korea was to know and understand the estimate as well as the team preparing it. He said, "the lesser ranks may do the research and even write the first drafts, but "the man," the J-2 himself, must get into the estimate early. It is *his* estimate, and he will have to defend it against all assailants and skeptics—of which there is always an ample supply."¹²

The first briefing to reflect the new philosophy was for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. It was a briefing, thanks to Morris and Graham, that Davidson considered the best he had ever given or heard. It mattered little that it failed to impress McNamara who sat by scribbling on some unrelated papers during the session. Summarizing its conclusions, Davidson wrote:

The briefing concluded by noting that the enemy was losing the insurgency war in South Vietnam, and to make up for these Viet Cong...losses, he was importing an increasing number of North Vietnamese Main force (Regular Army) units (NVA). With this NVA influx, the conflict was moving rapidly toward a conventional war. I prophesied that over the next several months, the enemy would attack through the DMZ and around the peripheries of South Vietnam to wear down United States forces and to gain the initiative. I forecast that the enemy would establish a new logistics route through the port of Sihanoukville to new and expanded bases in Cambodia (a development of far-reaching and momentous consequences.)¹³

As the J2 for MACV, Davidson was the senior intelligence official during the Tet Offensive launched in Vietnam on the night of 30-31 January 1968. This was considered by the American media to be a major intelligence failure responsible for sapping the will of the American people to continue the war in Vietnam. But from Davidson's point of view, Tet was only a mild surprise. They had expected attacks just before or just after Tet, so the timing of the attacks was not unexpected. They had underestimated the scope of the attack, that is, they did not think the enemy would be foolish enough to attack so many cities, a move that invited defeat on a wide scale. "No American or South Vietnamese official believed that the enemy would throw himself at the heart of Allied strength—the cities. The result of such rashness—a devastating Communist defeat—was predictable, and thus, intellectually unacceptable to General Westmoreland and to the other military professionals on his staff. One never attributes folly to his enemy—but then, ...of such presumptions are surprises made."¹⁴

The nemeses of the intelligence officer in Vietnam were the usual ones. Davidson listed them as "noise," the static of distracting information that obscures the true signal; the lack of hard intelligence about enemy intentions; the disunity of the intelligence effort or the failure to share information between the Americans and the South Vietnamese; preconception, the adherence to one hypothesis that leads to the rejection of any other theory that might disprove the favored thesis; and, finally, the one Davidson called "the grand dragon awaiting all intelligence officers and commanders," ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is that tendency to see everything in terms of your own culture, an outlook that breeds feelings of superiority to other cultures. This causes analysts to underestimate enemy motivation and overall strategy. He winds up his chapter on "Surprise" with the observation that surprise in military operations is endemic and both the intelligence officer and the commander have to stay flexible to deal with it. He added, "This is a helluva conclusion from a career intelligence officer—but there it is."¹⁵

Davidson was the first officer from the MI Corps to be promoted to general. He returned from Vietnam to become the Commanding General of the Army Training Center at Fort Ord. In 1971 he was the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, on the Department of the Army staff. One year later he became the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the position from which he retired in July 1974 as a lieutenant general. He held four awards of the Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Service Medal, in addition to his Silver Star, Bronze Star and Purple Heart.

Davidson, during his active career and following his retirement, was true to his own advice offered in 1948 to "'sell' intelligence to

commanders and everybody else.” After his retirement, Davidson wrote two books on the Vietnam War and one on intelligence operations. He has lectured on the Vietnam War and on intelligence and strategy at the U.S. Military Academy, the Air Force Academy, and numerous civilian colleges and universities. His essay on the Vietnam War appeared in the 1993 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. In 1994, as part of the officers’ professional development program at the Intelligence Center and School, he spoke at Fort Huachuca on “What it Takes to be a G2.”

He wrote *Vietnam at War* in 1988, hailed by many critics the most definitive book on the war. In 1990 he published a sequel called *The Secrets of the Vietnam War*, which limited itself to his experiences as the J2 for the Military Assistance Command Vietnam. It was this second book that had the most interest for the intelligence soldier. In it he picked up where he had left off in 1948, talking about some of those issues that confront the intelligence officer and his single client, the commander, time and again.

In an interview with Jeanette D. Lau printed in the March-April 1996 issue of the *INSCOM Journal*, Davidson discussed how the generals he served in three wars, Douglas MacArthur, William Westmoreland, and Creighton B. Abrams, Jr., used intelligence. In this final lecture before his death in February 1996, he reiterated the pitfalls of ethnocentrism and preconception that he dealt with in his second book on Vietnam. Then he described in turn the attitudes toward intelligence of his three wartime commanders.¹⁶

MacArthur, a genius with one of the best memories Davidson had encountered, based his decisions on written, four-page intelligence summaries. Davidson briefed him nightly on enemy activities over the past 24 hours and felt that MacArthur was not interested in the G2’s interpretation but preferred to act as his own intelligence officer, making his own assessments of enemy intentions. His best remembered error in this regard was believing the Chinese would not intervene in Korea.

Westmoreland, like Davidson, was a product of the World War II idea of being led by terrain objectives. He had little appreciation, Davidson concluded, of the value of intelligence until well into his tenure. Although he accepted estimates, Davidson didn’t think he used intelligence to determine his own plans and operations. He held Weekly Intelligence Estimate updates every Saturday morning in the form of a staff conference. This kind of open forum, Davidson believed, was an “excellent way to disseminate intelligence to a small leadership group.” Westmoreland was a flexible commander, wary of preconceptions, who warned his staff, “Let’s not get our minds fixed on one course of enemy action.” When Davidson realized the type and timing of the attacks that would take place on Tet, he rushed to Westmoreland with the information. The MACV commander agreed with his intelligence advisor’s information and picked up the phone to immediately put major commanders on alert. Davidson said he was “impressed how he quickly, flexibly, transferred his whole thought, his entire focus, to his counteroffensive.”

Abrams would visit the intelligence collectors in the field, listen to their theories and compliment them on the job they were doing. “It just worked wonders on their morale and effectiveness.” Abrams was “fascinated by the enemy’s situation, his condition and plans.” He received high marks from his former intelligence chief for avoiding preconceptions and maintaining a flexibility of response.

In concluding the interview, he referred to Field Manual 34-8, *Combat Commander’s Handbook on Intelligence*, which presented the concept of the commander tasking the intelligence officer in Davidson’s words: “Here’s what I want to know specifically and when I want to know it.” For Davidson, this manual and its pithy catchphrase “The Commander Drives Intelligence” achieved in theory the complete integration of the commander and the intelligence of-

ficer. The message he had championed at the beginning of his intelligence career had been acknowledged four decades later by official Army doctrine, but it still bore repeating. He then turned to the admonitory verb of the teacher, summing up:

In short, the commander must focus the intelligence effort. The commander must know what intelligence systems are available to support...and their capabilities and limitations. The commander must hold subordinate commanders strictly responsible for collecting priority intelligence requirements. Finally, the commander *and* the intelligence officer constantly monitor changes in the enemy situation and its potential effect on friendly plans and maneuvers. This integration of the commander/intelligence officer is the next step which will move intelligence into its rightful position as the key staff.¹⁷

Maj. Gen. John F. Stewart, Jr., whose own career as an intelligence officer found him running intelligence operations in Grenada, and the Gulf War, saw Davidson as a mentor and model ever since he worked for Davidson in Vietnam. Stewart acknowledged his doctrinal debt to Davidson, especially as it defined the “Commanders Drive Intelligence” idea.¹⁸

Davidson’s adult life was a bridge spanning the last half of the 20th century, a time during which he never ceased to teach and influence military intelligence thought within Army circles. Unlike the period following World War I when all of the hard-won intelligence lessons were largely lost in the trauma of post-war Army dismantlement, the lessons learned in the fields of the second World War, and they were many, were transmitted to successive generations by the Intelligence Department at Fort Riley and by the writings of Phillip B. Davidson, Jr. His life was testimony to the fact that the Army intelligence tradition is alive and that the values of each generation are passed along to the next.

Notes

1. Davidson, Phillip B., Jr., *Secrets of the Vietnam War*, Presidio, Novato, CA, 1990, p. 1.
2. Glass went on to a number of important intelligence assignments, including assistant G2 for the X Corps in the early years of the Korean War, and with the G2 Section of the Far East Command in Tokyo for the last years of the war. He was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Europe. When he retired as a major general in 1969, he was the chief of staff for the Defense Intelligence Agency. He died in 1979.
3. Davidson, Phillip B., Jr., and Glass, Robert R., *Intelligence is for Commanders*, Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, PA, 1948, pp. ix-x, 133.
4. This idea has been echoed some 40 years later by other intelligence officers presenting papers at a 1986 conference at the U.S. Army War College. Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit, who headed Israeli military intelligence from 1974 to 1979, realized that it was not enough to have a reliable and timely intelligence system. The system, to be used effectively, depends wholly on a reciprocal relationship between the intelligence officer and the decision maker. The intelligence officer must know what the commander needs to know, the essential elements of information, and the decision maker must be aware of how the intelligence system works. “It is imperative for decision-makers to be highly knowledgeable on the subject of intelligence, being of necessity its principal consumers.” The intelligence man, according to Gazit, has a “marketing” problem. He has to present his information in such a way that it is best understood and assimilated. Like Davidson, who rejected the notion of intelligence as crystal-ball-gazing and preferred to look at it as a science, Gazit shuns

the fortune-telling image and emphasizes that intelligence is limited to two endeavors: “(1) Specifically stating what may be expected, based on hard information about the other side’s resolutions; (2) Presenting the possibilities, based on knowledge of the other side’s general intentions and optimal technical feasibilities at its disposal.” He makes the point that, once the intelligence estimate is understood by the commander, he now has the right to discount it in favor of his personal inclinations. “Decisions made by political or military leaders should rely on intelligence to a great degree, but in no circumstances should intelligence be the sole factor in making a decision. This is something the intelligence analyst should recognize and understand. To put it bluntly, the decision-maker has a perfect right to disregard the advice of intelligence. There are always additional considerations, and it is his responsibility to evaluate them all and introduce his personal priorities. ...For decision-makers consciously to decide against an intelligence estimate is entirely legitimate, with the emphasis on ‘consciously’. This means that the decision-maker knows and understands the intelligence estimate but has found reason to decide against it. This is not the case when a decision contrary to the intelligence estimate is made unknowingly—whether because an estimate was never asked for or delivered, or arrived too late, or whether the decision-maker never got around to reading it or misunderstood it when he did.” [Gazit, Shlomo, “Intelligence Estimates and the Decision Maker,” in Handel, Michael I., *Leaders and Intelligence*, Frank Cass, London, 1989.]

R.V. Jones, the chief of British Scientific Intelligence during World War II, warned against the intelligence officer putting his own self-interest or that of his organization before the needs of the commander. He should never shield the commander from unpleasant truths or become susceptible to “Very Senior Officer Veneration Syndrome,” a condition that is characterized by telling the boss what he wants to hear so as to win favor for yourself and your section. Professor Jones also put his finger on the need to give to the leader only the most important and relevant points so as not to place too much demand on the commander’s time and thereby incapacitate him for action. “The intelligence officer’s problem is to paint a picture in a style that will best convey its intended content to the commander. Here, of course, he must be punctilious in making the picture as objective as possible, while inevitably emphasizing the points which he himself believes to be important; and he must not attempt to achieve emphasis by suppressing justifiable doubts about the validity of any evidence on which he draws. Essentially, though, it will be a picture that he presents and not a photograph with so much detail that the commander, unless he is exceptional, will be unable to digest. And, also essentially, it will be as coherent a picture as possible and not a jumble of jigsaw pieces individually tipped on the commander’s table from time to time.” He also called attention to the importance of timing when presenting information. Attention to this kind of professional detail will help form a relationship of trust and appreciation between the intelligence officer and commander. [Jones, R.V., “Intelligence and Command,” in Handel, Michael I., *Leaders and Intelligence*, Frank Cass, London, 1989.]

5. Davidson, *Secrets of the Vietnam War*, p. 93.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-5.

7. Some of the dynamics that occur in the intelligence process from the time of the intelligence estimate to the decision-maker’s acceptance are enumerated by Michael I. Handel in *Leaders and Intelligence*, Frank Cass, 1989, pp. 4-6.

1. If a leader is dogmatic, he will not be receptive to new information or information that contradicts his objectives and earlier policies and decisions. If he is too open-minded, he may change his opinion so frequently that he

- is incapable of providing clear leadership.
2. The relationship between the leader and intelligence adviser must maintain a delicate balance between intimacy and detachment. The danger of too intimate a relationship is that a professional intelligence adviser will identify so closely with the leader's past policies and decisions that he loses all sense of objectivity. On the other hand, too distant a relationship may enable the leader to maintain his independence at the high price of losing contact with the intelligence community. Some intelligence experts who have contemplated this dilemma believe that a leader would be better served if the senior intelligence adviser actually became a member of the cabinet, or at least attended all relevant cabinet meetings. Those critical of this suggestion protest that the intelligence adviser's direct participation in cabinet meetings would politicize his position while undermining his sense of perspective and objectivity (which is one of his chief assets).
 3. If the leader has one dominant intelligence adviser or is served by only one intelligence agency or source, the information he receives is likely to be limited or biased; but if he is advised by a variety of intelligence advisers or organizations, he may still fall victim to his own biases or political expediency. Having enjoyed the benefits of 'multiple advocacy', he might end up choosing the alternative that conforms to his preconceived ideas. Furthermore, he might be tempted (sometimes unconsciously) to rely on divide-and-rule tactics to manipulate his advisers into producing the information needed to support his policies or preconceptions. If he has no previous policies or preconceived ideas on a given subject, he might even opt for a compromise between the different reports and pursue a less effective policy. An additional drawback of multiple advisers and intelligence agencies is that coordination of their efforts may hobble the decision-making process, leading to a waste of time and resources.
 4. At times, every leader needs direct access to 'raw' intelligence, but if he becomes enmeshed in lower-level details too often, he runs the risk of becoming his own intelligence officer. In the complex modern world, the dangers of a leader becoming his own intelligence officer are numerous: a busy schedule does not allow him enough time to develop expertise in the subject without neglecting more important issues; he is unlikely to be an expert on the subject; and finally, he will be unable to remain objective on precisely those questions that interest him the most. Despite these obvious pitfalls, some degree of familiarity with the raw material is essential in developing a better 'feel' for intelligence work. It enables the leader to have a better idea of the reliability of the material and how it fits with his policies in ways that the intelligence expert cannot be expected to judge properly.
 5. If the leader is flooded with too much information, he may not have the time to study it seriously. He may also learn to rely too heavily on intelligence and expect it to decide for him, which can cause delays of important decisions. Too little information, on the other hand, may undermine the quality of his decisions.
 6. For the leader of the intelligence community (the intelligence adviser) the dilemma is this: if he always expresses his honest and most objective opinion, he may lose access to the leader; if he makes unpleasant intelligence more palatable through selective reporting and packag-

ing or by waiting for the most opportune moment, he may increase his influence but decrease the value of the intelligence.

8. Ibid.
9. McChristian, Joseph A., *Military Intelligence, Vietnam Studies*, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1974.
10. Davidson, Phillip B., Jr., *Secrets of the Vietnam War*, Presidio, Novato, CA, 1990, p. 11.
11. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 14.
14. Ibid., p. 104.
15. Ibid., p. 115.
16. In a paper delivered to the U.S. Army War College in April 1986, Dr. Harold Deutsch examined the attitudes toward intelligence of World War II commanders. After studying such leaders as Wavell, Auchinleck, Montgomery, Alexander, Eisenhower, Clark, Bradley, Patton and Rommel, he found that the commander's personality and experience largely determined his receptivity to intelligence. And what was seen repeatedly was the commander's inclination to shun any intelligence that countered his plans or vision about the outcome of the campaign. Deutsch, Harold C., "Generals and the Use of Intelligence," in Handel, Michael I., *Leaders and Intelligence*, Frank Cass and Co., London, 1989, pp. 254-6.
17. Lau, Jeanette D., "How the Big Three (MacArthur, "Westy" and "Abe") Used Intelligence," *INSCOM Journal*, March-April 1996, pp. 16-22.
18. Various unrecorded conversations between Maj. Gen. Stewart and the author