

The Intelligence Impulse: A Showcase for U.S. Army Intelligence History

As a formal organization, Military Intelligence made a late appearance in the U.S. Army, waiting more than 100 years to debut as a tiny section within the Adjutant General's Office. It would have to wait another three decades years for the demands of 20th century warfare to validate Military Intelligence as an equal partner on the War Department staff. It took the leadership of men like Arthur Wagner, Ralph Van Deman, Parker Hitt and Charles Young to sell a simple idea—"Intelligence if for Commanders." Today, that principle is the cornerstone of U.S. Army intelligence doctrine.



How that idea has evolved over the last 200 years is the subject of a new museum at Fort Huachuca. It is a story that has waited patiently to be told. Like the intelligence corps in general, this chapter made a late appearance in the volume of American military history. It existed in the minds of a few historians and has been sketched out in a few thin history books, but now for the first time it gains dimension, the dimension of the artifact that connects us to the past. The new museum, brought to you by the same team that built the Fort Huachuca Museum, acts as a central repository for those items of history that help put the military intelligence story in perspective. Most importantly, it is a teaching tool within the U.S. Army Intelligence School.

Less directed at the local community and tourists, the Intelligence Museum focuses more emphatically on the student and faculty of the Intelligence School. It includes a library on the premises and will have a study room with video and computer capabilities. Its bookstore will carry all of the titles that are required or suggested reading in the school's curriculum. The Intelligence Museum will become an integral part of the Program of Instruction. Specific history books are being written to meet the needs of history instruction at the school.

Inside the front door is a blackboard with the museum's

mission spelled out. It tells us that the purpose of the museum is to act as a transmitter of the experiences and values of those who have gone before. We believe that the resultant knowledge will not only better equip our stakeholders to carry out their professional duties, but enrich them with a sense of belonging to a larger tradition with common goals and shared values.

When we talk about the tradition of the U.S. Army, we are not referring to a completed edifice, enclosing our generation in its shadows, but an organic thing, with living components. The tradition is still being created, growing cell by cell as today's soldiers bring their contributions to the common purpose of national service.

The development of the U.S. Army Intelligence Museum bears witness to the premise that our tradition is still in the making. This museum is not merely a few interesting or significant items collected within the walls of a freshly painted gallery. It is an eloquent expression of a common belief, held by many in the military intelligence community that history has the power to instruct. And even to entertain.

Sidney Mashbir believed that intelligence officers were born, not made. "You can send a candidate for Intelligence work to every school of every service, in every army and country in the world—but if that "inner spark" that baffles definition is lacking he will always be a dud.

...You could study Intelligence, Cryptanalysis, Photo-Interpretation, Battle Order, Terrain, and Prisoner Interrogation all your life, but you'd never be worth a damn as a real Intelligence officer if you didn't have that *Intelligence impulse*." To be an intelligence officer, Mashbir concluded, "a vivid but logical imagination is a highly important attribute."

We agree with Mashbir that it takes something special to be an intelligence officer and that imagination plays a key role. The Army Intelligence Museum uses history in an attempt to discover what that *intelligence impulse* is.





**U.S. Army Intelligence Museum
Building 41411 (6,070 sq. ft.)**

Remembering MI History

From Maj. Gen. Ralph Van Deman, called the “Father of Military Intelligence,” to Lt. Col. Arthur Nicholson, tragically killed in the course of his duties in East Germany, much has transpired that can guide and inspire the MI soldier. Van Deman had the vision to forge a MI section in the War Department in 1917. Nicholson gave his life in 1985, just a few years before the collapse of Communism. These two men stand at opposite ends of a 70-year span that has witnessed far-reaching changes in the craft of intelligence. But the components of imagination and duty within the MI Corps have not changed at all.

“Army Intelligence School” brass plaque. This building plaque dates from 1955 when the Counterintelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland, became The Army Intelligence School, with the expanded mission of training all combat intelligence and field operating agency personnel. The

school relocated to Fort Huachuca in 1971. (MIC0122)



Mission

The purpose of this museum is to act as a transmitter of the experiences



and values of those who have gone before. That knowledge will better equip our clients to carry out their professional duties and enrich them with a sense of belonging to a larger organization with shared goals and achievements.

The Father of Military Intelligence: Col. Ralph H. Van Deman

Generally regarded as the “Father of Military Intelligence,” Maj. Gen. Ralph Van Deman had served in military intelligence roles in the Philippines and the Far East before being assigned to the War Department in 1916. Just before World War I, he urged the formation of an intelligence organization within the Army, but

his proposal was rejected by the Army Chief of Staff Hugh Scott, who felt that the U.S. Army could rely on British and French information about the enemy. Using his political connections, Van Deman bypassed the Chief of Staff and took his plan directly to the Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. Baker approved the concept and on May 3,

1917, the Military Intelligence Section of the War College Division, War Department General Staff, was created with Major Van Deman as its first chief.

Huachuca’s First MI Officer—Charles D. Young

Charles Young graduated from West Point in 1889, the third African-American to do so, and was assigned to the 10th Cavalry. His entire field career was spent in black regiments—the 9th and 10th Cavalry, and the 25th Infantry. Young was an accomplished linguist, speaking Latin, Greek, French, Spanish and German. When he was not serving with one of the black regiments, he was assigned to military intelligence duties. He was one of the early military attaches, making extended reconnaissances into Haiti and Santo Domingo. He reported for duty in 1907 to the War Department’s 2d Division, the name given to the section of the new general staff responsible for collecting and disseminating military intelligence. He would

serve on two more occasions as a military attache, serving two more tours to Liberia.

The Man Who Wrote the Book on Intelligence

Arthur L. Wagner is best remembered as a military thinker and advocate of professional education within the U.S. Army, but he was also a pioneering intelligence officer. In 1893 he wrote the first text in the U.S. Army on military intelligence, called *The Service of Security and Information*. He became head of the Military Information Division of the Adjutant Generals Office, the embryo intelligence organization for the U.S. Army in 1896. There he directed the collection of intelligence in preparation for the Spanish-American War until 1898 when he was ordered to Cuba to set up the first Bureau of Military Information to be organized in the field since the Civil War. In his postwar writings, Wagner called for a separate military intelligence organization

within the Army that would serve commanders in the field. But the small, American regular Army of 1898 was not ready to recognize this degree of sophistication and the Military Information Division would remain little more than a specialized library.

How Much Do You Know About



SIGINTEW?

What message is this Army cryptology class of 1918 sending? “Knowledge is power,” in Morse code.

The M-94 Code Cylinder

Cipher Device, Cylindrical, Model 94. The U.S. Army adopted the M-94 cipher device in

1923. The cylindrical code wheel was conceived by Thomas Jefferson, the third president of the United States, who had an abiding interest in cryptology. It was refined by Colonel Parker Hitt, America’s leading code expert at the time, just prior to World War I. The device was used in the field until World War

SIGINT has played a major part in the U.S. Army’s modern history ever since the 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico when Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing reported: “By tapping the various telegraph and telephone wires and picking up wireless messages we were able to get practically all the information passing between the various leaders in Mexico.

Telegraph Practice Kit, Model AN/GGQ-1.

Used to train Morse code intercept. (Courtesy Robert S. Vandiver) (MIC0138)



II, when it was replaced by the M-209 code convertor. (Courtesy Military Intelligence Corps Museum Foundation) (MIC0133)



A coded message was sent from the Mexican government to the governor of Sonora in 1886. It warned the governor not to trust the Apache renegade Geronimo in any negotiations with that Apache leader. A U.S. Army cryptanalyst decoded the message in 1977 in under 30 minutes without using any mechanical or computer

aids. He had an important clue. He knew the name "Geronimo" appeared in the message.

Instructograph. Used to train Army Signal intercept personnel in Morse code intercept during the 1920s; used in stand-alone configuration or with a trainer key system. (Transferred from USAIC&FH) (MIC0113)



Set of Six Paper Tapes for the Instructograph. (Transferred from USAIC & FH) (MIC0114)



The Hagelin M-209
Based on a design by the Swedish inventor, Boris Hagelin, this cipher machine was widely used by the Army and Navy from late 1942 until after the Korean War. The

primary application was for tactical messages at division level and below. When properly set and operated, it will encipher a plain text paper tape in 5-letter groups; or it will decipher a message that has been encrypted by another M-209, printing the clear text on a paper tape with proper spacing between the works.

William Friedman



The giant of U.S. Army cryptology, Friedman became the Chief Cryptanalyst of the Signal Corps in 1922. His many publications made him preeminent in the field. His series of Army texts, *Military Cryptanalysis*, are the most lucid presentations on the solution of basic ciphers that have ever been published. He

reached the peak of his career when he and his team solved the Japanese PURPLE code system in 1940. The strain of his wartime work led to a nervous breakdown and his retirement as a lieutenant colonel in the Signal Corps reserves.

Transmitter secreted in rearview mirror. In 1985 Lt. Col.

riel Division was tasked with making a covert transmitter that could send back a distress signal. A rearview mirror was specially fabricated to conceal a receiver/transmitter and antenna to relay signals sent by U.S. Army soldiers holding small transmitters. The mirror replicates in every respect the standard equipment of the Mercedes Gelandenwagon. This was important so that the antenna could not be discovered and destroyed by East German or Soviet military personnel. (Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0255)



Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., an MI officer, was gunned down by a Soviet sentry while on an observation mission inside East Germany. These reconnoissances were allowed for members of the liaison missions under a long-standing international agreement. To help prevent future incidents, the Intelligence Mate-

Sections of the Berlin Wall. These three sections of the Berlin Wall, salvaged after the reunification of Germany on 9 November 1989, came from the inner wall, facing West Berlin. To stem the flow of Germans from East Berlin to the free West, Soviet soldiers laid the

first blocks of the wall on August 17, 1961. Along with its barbed wire and guard towers, it immediately became an ugly symbol of Communist repression and the division of East and West. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the wall was dismantled by citizens of both sides in a mood of celebration. (MIC0001)

Sign, "You Are Leaving the American Sector."

Posted on the East German side of Checkpoint Charlie at the entry to East Berlin. (Transferred by USAREUR) (MIC0111)

Sign, "Attention! Passage of Members of Foreign Military Liaison Missions Prohibited!" Posted at Soviet/East German military restricted area until the end of the Cold War in 1989. (Transferred by USAREUR) (MIC0112)

Binocular Periscope, Model H/6400. Used by East German Border Guards at the Berlin Wall. (Transferred by USAREUR) (MIC0121)

Mercedes-Daimler/Benz Geländewagen. Purchased in January 1989 for about \$35,000, this Mercedes Benz Geländewagen is a 280 GE Super model that was used by the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the commander of Soviet forces in East Germany as a reconnaissance vehicle. With the unification of Germany in 1989, the

U.S. Army Intelligence Museum. (Transferred from USAREUR) (MIC0118)

License Plate, USMLM. This pair of license plates were used to identify U.S. Military Liaison Vehicles in the Soviet Zone. (Transferred from USAREUR) (MIC0130A&B)



job of the Military Liaison Mission ended, but the vehicle was deployed in 1991 to Northern Iraq as part of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a relief mission to help Kurdish refugees. The U.S. Army logged 35,382 miles and spent \$25,600 in maintenance. In 1992, it was donated by the German government to the

Circa 1957 SD-1 Surveillance Drone

In 1954 Fort Huachuca was reopened as a test site for some of the Army's electronic warfare gear. The Army's first surveillance drone, the SD-1, was flown here from 1957 to 1961, and used mainly for photo surveillance. The radio-controlled plane carried a still camera in its fuse-

lage and was recovered by parachute. This drone, called "Old Faithful," was one of the few survivors of those grueling test flights which ushered in the era of intelligence and electronic warfare at Huachuca. After surviving 50 flights and parachute landings in the mesquite of the high desert, it was retired from service. It was replaced by the improved SD-2 and then by jet-powered models. Today the Intelligence Center continues that tradition, testing aircraft and training crews at its Unmanned Aerial Vehicle facility.

Aquila Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

The Army Intelligence School began development of this Aquila remotely piloted vehicle in 1972, but abandoned the vehicle as a surveillance platform because of its limited range. It carried a video camera and laser range-finder in its turret, and relayed target data via a jam-resistant data link. It was launched by catapult and recovered by guiding it into a large net. (Transferred from Redstone Arsenal, U.S. Army Missile Com-

mand) (MIC0062)

IMINT—Pioneering Aerial Reconnaissance

The use of the newly developed military asset, the airplane, for reconnaissance missions was first undertaken in the Philippines and then along the Mexican border between 1913 and 1915. Later, during Pershing's 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico in pursuit of the bandit turned revolutionary Pancho Villa, the First Aero Squadron was deployed to support Pershing with aerial reconnaissance. Their purpose was thwarted however, when the planes were unable to reach the altitudes necessary in the mountains of northern Chihuahua. Instead, the aviators were relegated to the role of flying dispatches from headquarters to the roving columns of cavalry.

The Army Air Corps had the mission of aerial reconnaissance during the second World War, using unarmed P-38s with their distinctive long-range fuel tanks under the wings. These planes were also known as F-5As. Armed F6s

were also used so that pilots could attack targets of opportunity. By 1944 the Air Corps had an armada of photo recce planes in tactical reconnaissance squadrons.

So much had the aerial reconnaissance mission burgeoned that over 200 missions were flown in one month in 1943 and over half a million prints were de-



livered.

Intelligence at Work in the Gulf War

Overall, DESERT STORM could be adjudged as an overwhelming success for U.S. Army intelligence. This conclusion was expressed by a captured Iraqi officer who noted: "We had a great appreciation of your intelli-

gence system; we knew from our experience in the Iranian War that at all times you could see us during day and night and knew where we were on the ground. If we communicated, you could both hear us and target us and destroy us with your ordnance. On the other hand, as we looked at our intelligence system, we had no idea where you were

on the ground; we had no intelligence system capabilities to see what your dispositions were, and we had no way to monitor your communications. We knew you were going to attack only when you overran our front line positions...."

Order of Battle board, Iraqi. Captured by U.S. Forces on 26 Feb-

ruary 1992 during Operation DESERT STORM. This Iraqi Order of Battle lacks sophistication, but it is reported to have been an accurate depiction of the allied force deployment. (Transferred from Cdr, V Corps) (MIC0127)



Chief Warrant Officer Tom Hennen

The first warrant officer and military payload specialist in space was selected from among 700 applicants to be a crewmember of Atlantis shuttle mission STS-44. Tom Hennen was an 18-year veteran of the Army in 1992 and an imagery interpreter. From 1981 to 1986, he developed imagery interpretation courses at Huachuca's U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. He was not a part of the astronaut corps but a specialist selected for the mission because of his Army intelligence training. But he did participate in some of the space ex-

periments that were outside his assigned mission. Working aboard the shuttle for seven days in space, the crew members dressed for comfort and ease of movement.

Coin, MI Corps. The first MI Corps coin in space with CW3 Thomas J. Hennen, payload specialist for the 9th flight of the space shuttle *Atlantis*. Signed in Gold ink by the entire crew. Transferred from USAIC&FH (MIC0141)

Military Intelligence in the Space Age

Terra Scout, an initiative of Fort Huachuca's U.S. Army Intelligence Center, was an earth observation experiment which combined the skills of an imagery analyst using an advanced optical sensor. CWO3 Tom Hennen was the analyst, chosen from some 700 candidates to be the military payload specialist aboard the space shuttle *Atlantis* mission which blasted off from Florida on November 24, 1991. He became the first U.S. Army warrant officer to fly in space as

part of the Army's Military Man in Space Program. The equipment he used was called the Spaceborne Direct-View Optical system, an optical sensor that allowed Hennen to view preselected sites from 200 miles up in space, traveling at 17,500 miles per hour. The program was intended to determine military applications of



man's unique powers of observation and decision-making in space.

This Welrod pistol is a 7.65 mm sound-suppression weapon designed by the British during the second World War for use by their intelligence agents in occupied Europe and the Far East. The weapon's primary function was silent sentry re-

moval. In 1943 the American, British, and Free French intelligence organizations began the JEDBURGH teams. These three-man teams, comprised of one man from each nation, were deployed to occupy France to organize, train, and arm the French Resistance in preparation for the D-Day landings. The Welrod pistol was a

standard issue weapon for these highly successful teams. It makes a sound comparable to the snapping of your fingers.



The Race for Atomic Technology

In Europe, teams of CIC men followed U.S. forces into combat with the mission of scouting out and capturing German work on the atomic bomb and rocketry, and taking into custody German scientists. This was known as the "ALSOS" mission, led by Col. Boris Pash who with daring and imagination personally led his teams into enemy-held territory. In addition to German and Italian scientists, they seized over 70 tons of uranium and radium products that were shipped to the United States for use in American nuclear projects.

The Counter Intelligence Corps

The Corps of Intelligence Police formed in World War I was renamed the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in 1942. In the U.S., the CIC was responsible for the security of the Manhattan Project, the secret scientific work on the atomic bomb, and performed censorship duties for all mail arriving from overseas. Counter

Intelligence Corps detachments were assigned to each Army division in the North African, European and Pacific theaters, with a total of 241 CIC detachments operating during the war. Overseas the CIC secured and captured enemy headquarters, interrogated prisoners, and impounded enemy documents. They arrested or surveilled any suspected enemy agents. They surveyed and protected public utilities, supply depots, or any other potential targets of sabotage. They seized radio stations and telephone switchboards, halting all communications and turning over any communications data to the Signal Corps. They shut down presses and seized mail for censorship teams. They cooperated with local provost marshals on matters of law and order. CIC operatives familiarized themselves with local economic, political and social conditions, and cultivated well-placed informants.

Lie Detector, portable, Model 7AC. Used prior to 1948 by the

Counter Intelligence Corps, its correct name is Electronic Psychometer, a device that measured perspiration to determine if the subject was telling the truth. Unlike the polygraph which measures changes in blood pressure, breathing and skin response, this early version of the lie detector depended on only galvanic skin response, or



perspiration. The Counter Intelligence Corps began using polygraphs around 1948. (Courtesy Everett P. Gibbs) (MIC0128)

Armband, CIC Agent. Used to identify Counter Intelligence Corps agents during refugee screening in Germany. CIC agents set up

screening points at the Rathaus or in the town square and all residents were rounded up for screening. (MIC0144)

CIC Plaque. This brass relief of the Counter Intelligence Corps symbol was mounted at Fort Holabird, Maryland, when that post became home for the

Counter Intelligence Center and School in 1945. (MIC0146)

Street Sign, "Intelligence Street." Original street sign from Fort Holabird, Md. (MIC0154)

Street Sign, "Counter Street." Original street sign from Fort Holabird, Md. (MIC0155)

The CIC's War in the Pacific

In the European theater, many of the CIC's counterespionage duties were usurped by the Office of Strategic Studies. But in the Pacific, that was prevented by a command directive from General MacArthur's headquarters, proscribing the OSS from operating in the Southwest Pacific Area. There was another important difference in CIC operations in the Pacific. With fewer urban areas to secure or captured soldiers to interrogate, the CIC was able to devote more of its time assisting with combat intelligence and in working on captured documents. In the Leyte campaign, CIC took into custody officials working for the Japanese, and in Luzon in January 1945, 30 CIC detachments came ashore with the invasion force.

A New Technology for the U.S. Army


Hitt wrote the U.S. Army's first publication on cryptology in 1915

when his *Manual for the Solution of Military Ciphers* was printed at Fort Leavenworth. It is shown here both in his typescript draft and in the final published form. From 1914 to 1917, Hitt developed a code machine that, after some improvements by Joseph Mauborgne, Chief of the Signal Corps' Engineering and Research Division, would become in 1922 the Army's M-94. It was used up until World War II. In the 1930s it was replaced by the M-138a, which incorporated some more improvements on Hitt's prototype. His hand-crafted prototype is seen here.

U.S. Army Intelligence in the Spanish-American War

It was the first American war in which a military intelligence function was up and running before the war began. Thanks to the foresight of Lt. Col. Arthur L. Wagner, the pre-war chief of the Military Information Division, special studies, orders of battle, and maps on Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philip-

pinos were on hand in 1898. Later, he organized the Bureau of Military Information which would be assigned to Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter's V Corps to centralize and collate all intelligence information in the Cuban theater. As visionary as this organization was for its day, it would not get off the ground due to petty rivalries.



Shafter dismissed the bureau, believing that Wagner was sent by the Army's Commanding General to spy on him. On the other side of the world in 1898, an Insurgent Records Office was created in the Manila headquarters of the Expeditionary Force in the Philippines to sift through and translate the boxes of captured documents that could

furnish valuable information to the field commanders. The importance of the work led to MI offices at Army posts throughout the islands. Military intelligence had little or no effect on the war's outcome, but because of the commitment of a dozen officers, it spread out from its few rooms in the War Department to the prov-

emony. This document established the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Branch, effective 1 July 1962. It was signed by G. H. Decker, Army Chief of Staff. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0199)



Through the Lenses of Surveillance

The commander must be able to see the battlefield and, to accomplish this, he has historically relied upon soldiers filling an intelligence role. The intelligencer pieced together his picture of the battlefield using reconnaissance, interrogation of prisoners and natives, and most often by direct observation. The tools of surveillance range from the simple telescope of the Napoleonic era to the satellite cameras of today. Arrayed here are some of those instruments of surveillance. In their lenses are reflected the ingenuity of the intelligence sol-

inces of Cuba and the jungles of the Philippines. As memory of the war receded, so too did intelligence work. It would take a world war to revive the craft in the second decade of the 20th century.

The Knowlton Room

General Orders No. 38, framed with photos of the signing cer-

dier.

Camera, Model Nikon F4. Used by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in East Germany during the Cold War. Improved cameras, like this Nikon F4, with their fast shutter speeds and long focal length lenses were used by agents on the ground to get high-resolution pictures without the distortion that was formerly associated with surreptitious photography. (Transfer from U S A R E U R) (MIC0069)

Camera, Model Nikkor AF. Used by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in East Germany during the Cold War. (Transfer from U S A R E U R) (MIC0070)

Pocket Scope, Night Vision. (With case) Used by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) in East Germany during the Cold War. The Night Vision Pocketscope (M911A), a battery-powered electro-optical instrument, could amplify reflected starlight, skyglow, or

moonlight to give the operator a clear scene. It was used for observation, photography, television or film. (Transfer from U S A R E U R) (MIC0071A&B)

These Night Vision Binoculars (M975/M976) offered medium to long range observation by amplifying starlight or moonlight to intensify images. They would not work in rain, fog or



smoke.

Night Vision Binoculars, Model 976, Litton, with case. Used by members of the U.S. Military Liaison in East Germany during the Cold War. (Transferred from USAREUR) (MIC0072A&B)

These binoculars belonged to Major General Joseph D. Patch who was born at Fort

Huachuca in 1885 and commanded the 80th Infantry Division during the fighting in Europe in World War II.

Camera Assembly for Remotely piloted Vehicle. A Canon zoom television lens rotates in its aluminum gimbal assembly to record live images of enemy activity and search out targets to the front of friendly

sors, like Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), infrared systems, and both optical and digital cameras. The items shown in this display are related to optical, or photographic, imagery which can encompass vertical views shot from directly overhead for the least amount of distortion, oblique pictures taken at an angle to the ground, or panoramic views of the battlefield taken with special cameras that scan a wide area. They are recorded on film for detailed analysis of objects, weapon systems, enemy activity and terrain features.

Calling into play their exploitation skills, the imagery analyst can update maps for specific military operations, brief aircrews, prepare target folders and battle damage assessments, and put together mosaics and terrain tables for operational planning.

Stereoscope Set, Model MS-1. Used by imagery interpreters to analyze aerial photographs and film. (Transferred from 32d ADCOM G2) (MIC0134)

positions. It was designed to be mounted in the nose of remotely piloted vehicles like the Aquila which were under development in the 1980s. (MIC0147)

The Imagery Analyst

Imagery analysts are intelligence specialists trained in the techniques of interpreting imagery collected by aerial sen-

The lens stereoscope provides a three-dimensional view of an image by placing it upon a pair of overlapping identical photographs. Lens stereoscopes are considered the single most important tool of the imagery analyst. They have the advantage of compactness, portability and low cost, but are restricted by their limited field of view. They come in a number of sizes and magnifications.

Non-stereoscopic viewers include monocular magnifiers and light tables, both part of the kit shown below. Other tools, familiar to the draftsman, are used to plot comparative locations, determine scale and distance, and transfer photo details to overlays and larger scale maps.

This Photo Interpretation Kit was used by Army imagery analysts between 1950 and 1968. The Abrams stereoscope, which gave aerial photos their three-dimensional quality, was soon overtaken by more sophisticated viewing technology.

Photo Interpretation Kits. Used by imagery

interpreters during 1950s and early 1960s, it contains an Abrams stereoscope; monocular scope; plastic triangle; scissors, protractor; height finder scale; engineer ruler; magnifier and a compass. (Transfer from USAIC&FH) (MIC0076 and MIC0077)

*Cold War Tradecraft:
SECRET No More*



First organized as the Counter Intelligence Police in 1917, the counterintelligence arm of military intelligence was finally combined in the Intelligence and Security Command in 1977. Practising the discipline known as human intelligence (HUMINT), the counterintelligence agent was charged with pro-

tecting U.S. Army forces from sabotage, spying and security leaks. They did that by conducting investigations of suspected security risks and mounting clandestine operations of their own aimed at the Communist bloc enemies of the U.S. Army. That mission was significantly sheared away when the Defense Investigative

Service took over security investigations in 1974 and further reduced when the single greatest threat to U.S. Army operations, the Soviet Union, was dissolved in 1989. Today, counterintelligence is a multidisciplined function charged with protecting operational U.S. forces from enemy attempts to breach security.

The nature of intelligence work requires specialized tools and techniques, called tradecraft, and almost always demands the highest degree of secrecy. Whether taking pictures of enemy people, equipment or installations; measuring the electronic emanations of weaponry; listening to enemy communications; checking a room for surveillance devices; or reporting information from behind enemy lines, intelligence agents had to conceal their purpose lest they be apprehended or killed.


All of the items in this display were furnished by the Intelligence Materiel Division, a unique organization with the U.S. Army intelligence community which procures, customizes, or fabricates devices to meet the needs of specific counterintelligence operations. Until the recent abatement of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union and its communist allies, much of this tradecraft hardware was classified.

Tree Limb, fabricated. A tree limb that was cast in latex, colored to match actual trees in the area where it would be used, hollowed out to plant a video camera and transmitter inside it, and secured to a tree in a forest next to an enemy airbase. The real time video pictures could provide important tip-offs about enemy buildups and heightened war preparations. (Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0223)

Stereoscope, 4X. (Transferred from USAIC&FH) (MIC0224)



Display Case, with 130 MI unit crests. (Courtesy William F. Morgan, Jr.) (MIC0225)



Display Case, with 20 shoulder sleeve patches for U.S. Army intelligence units. (Courtesy William F. Morgan, Jr.) (MIC0226)



Pens, felt tip, fabricated. A working felt tip pen that was fitted with a carbide steel, circular scraper on one end that could be used to obtain surreptitious paint and metal samples. As an agent walked by a targeted piece of equipment, he could scratch it with his pen and a magnet would pull the shavings up inside

the pen. (Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0227A&B)

Holder, license plate. A quick-change license plate and holder that was designed to enable someone to swap their license plates in a few seconds. (Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0228A&B)

Thermos Bottle. A thermos bottle designed for use by attaches that could actually contain coffee while at the same time concealing in its false bottom any number of devices, including an infra-red heat detector that could examine electrical wiring and circuits behind walls to detect enemy bugging devices.

(Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0229A, B&C)

Attache Case, Samsonite. (Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0230)

Brief Case, with Robot Star Camera. (Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0231)

Power plug. (Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0232)

Monitor Record antenna. (Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division) (MIC0233)

Adapter, keyer, MX4498/GRA-71. (Courtesy Intelligence

Materiel Division)
(MIC0234)

Radio Receiver.

(Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division)
(MIC0235)

Agent transmitter.

(Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division)
(MIC0236)

A series of historic agent radios that describe the evolution of transmitting instructions and reports to and from enemy territory. The first of these, used in the 1950s, did not allow for voice communications, but used a Morse-code sending key. By using triangulation, enemy security forces could close in on the source of the signal, making transmitting a risky business. Successful models allowed for voice communication, but still carried the danger of discovery if the agent stayed in one place for very long. The latest model, called the Caber Aztec, featured a solar collector that could be used as a power source. It had a range of hundreds of miles. But the most important improvement was a computerized storage

capacity, which meant that the user could stash the unit in a safe place, like behind the wall or in a tree in a public area, and, by employing a hand-held transmitter/receiver, simply send his pre-coded and recorded messages by walking by and triggering the device on his person. The radio could be programmed to then relay the message at a later



time. Designed to save agent's lives, they would never have to risk being caught in the immediate vicinity of the radio at the time of transmission.

World War I

To organize and head his AEF G2 section, Pershing selected a 45-year-old colonel of infantry who had distin-

guished himself in the fighting around Santiago, Cuba, in 1898 and who had experience with the Military Information Division in 1905 as a captain. Dennis E. Nolan was a former West Point instructor and a friend of Van Deman. Nolan was the first U.S. Army officer to be called the "G2," and he had the widest span of intelligence responsibilities

that had ever been seen in the American Army until that time.

General Pershing said of Nolan's work, "the importance [of intelligence] can hardly be overestimated. The successful operation of an army in the field depends upon the accuracy of its information regarding the situation and probable intentions of the enemy.

General Nolan carefully studied the systems in vogue in the Allied armies and selected the best features of each, with the result that no army was better served by its intelligence bureau than was our own."

Nolan asked Van Deman back in Washington for some NCOs who had investigative experience and who could speak French. Van Deman sent him 50 sergeants who became the nucleus for the Counter Intelligence Police officially organized in August 1917.

In the AEF, intelligence was now recognized as a critical element of war-fighting. Up and down the command structure could be found G2s. Starting at the infantry battalion, an intelligence staff officer could call upon a reconnaissance platoon of 15 scouts, 11 observers, and 2 snipers, a total of 28. The regimental intelligence officer had eight observers. Each division had a G2 who also was assigned men to act as observers. At the Corps level, the G2 could rely upon observation posts, balloons, aero squadrons with

both visual and photographic recon, and flash or sound-ranging teams which targeted enemy artillery. These tools gave him the ability to look five miles beyond the enemy's front-line positions.

The U.S. Army's first combat intelligence manual, written by the intelligence staff of the American Expeditionary Force in 1917, advised that the intelligence officer "does not wait for information, but goes after it, visiting the units of the first line as often as possible and particularly verifying the accuracy of observations."

It was during World War I that the U.S. Army began for the first time to pay serious attention to communications security (COMSEC), compiling two-part codes for use by the First and Second U.S. Armies. Called the "River" and "Lake" codes, they were distributed down to regimental level. Realizing the Germans could in time break the codes, they were changed at least every two weeks. If the codebook for the "River" code was lost, the operator was appro-

priately instructed to send the code group "DAM."

This badge was used after the first World War by personnel of the Military Intelligence Division. The intelligence function of the U.S. Army underwent a serious decline between wars and on the eve of World War II had only 20 officers.



Booklet, *Regimental Instructions for Intelligence Service* Originally classified SECRET, it was prepared by the Intelligence Section, General Staff, Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, December 1917. (Courtesy Joel Hickman) (MIC0091)

World War II

Assigned as George Patton's G2 for almost the entire war, Oscar Koch was one of those intelligence officers who made a difference in most combat operations and who midwived the tactical intelligence art as it is known to modern warfare. His opinion was sought by Patton and other staffers in Third Army and his soft-spo-

ken, diligent, prudent, and consistently on-the-money estimates won for him the confidence of his commander. In that war Patton is remembered as one of the sole risk-takers among the allied leadership. The risks were enabled and, to some degree, ameliorated by the good intelligence provided by Koch. Up until that time, World War II was

the war in which intelligence gained its greatest acceptance among the allied nations, and, not surprisingly, its greatest triumphs. Koch was one of the reasons why. It is fair to say that both Patton, the commander, and Koch, the G2, learned from and complimented one another during the course of their long staff relationship.

World War II was an "intelligence war." In the U.S. Army alone, thousands of men and women became engaged in intelligence-related work over a wide spectrum of disciplines in separate theaters around the globe, and at levels from strategic headquarters down to tactical companies. As a result, the war gave rise to many stories of individual achievement and innovation that would have a lasting effect on how intelligence would be thought about and conducted in future American wars. On the ground there was a cavalry reconnaissance troop in every infantry division and in each regiment there was an Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon. At division level there

were teams of interpreters, interrogators, Order-of-Battle specialists and photo interpreters, while at Corps and Army headquarters there were intelligence detachments. In the sky were Army Air Force P-38s with long-range fuel tanks under the wings and some of George Goddard's cameras in their bellies that would take over a half million prints in 1943 alone. In the "ether" the U.S. Army Signal Corps controlled its domain with a dizzying array of transmitters, receivers, jammers, scanners, direction-finders and radars. The Signal Intelligence Service, in cooperation with British cryptanalysts, decrypted and decoded all of the most secret German and Japanese communications and distributed the results, called Ultra, to a select list of combat commanders through special liaison officers who would become known as Special Security Officers. In the field, Radio Intelligence platoons, companies and battalions intercepted, fixed, decoded and analyzed enemy communications at levels lower than Ultra. The communications intelli-

gence specialists numbered about 26,000 by war's end, and they ushered in the era of electronic warfare. Deception operations reached new heights of sophistication, with specially created units conning German intelligence in the Mediterranean and around Normandy as to where the main offensive blows would fall.

Training in the several intelligence disciplines was carried out in a range of schools across the country. The Signal Corps operated its SIGINT school for officers and civilians at Arlington Hall, its headquarters and a former junior college for girls, while enlisted personnel were trained at Vint Hill Farms in Warrenton, Virginia. The Counter Intelligence Corps conducted CI training at its U.S. Army Investigative Training School in Chicago. The Military Intelligence Service Language School gave language training to second generation Japanese-Americans at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. For most intelligence personnel, the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie,

Maryland, was the training site. There, in an old National Guard Armory, 19,669 combat intelligence specialists were graduated during the war.

There were no single persons shaping the direction of intelligence as there had been with George Washington in the Revolutionary War, Ethan Allen Hitchcock in the Mexican War, George Sharpe and Grenville Dodge in the Civil War, Arthur Wagner in the Spanish-American War, and Ralph Van Deman and Dennis Nolan in World War I. Instead, there were a host of intelligence leaders, each taking care of their piece of the action, and doing so in a manner that would reflect credit upon them and make them worthy of emulation by future generations of intelligence officers.

During World War II, Lieutenant Carl P. Palmer was the intelligence officer (S-2) for the 824th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The unit participated in the invasion of southern France with the Seventh Army and was variously attached to the

100th, 45th, 36th and 103d Divisions during the allied advance through France, Germany and Austria. These were the intelligence files he maintained throughout the war.

This Japanese map of Pearl Harbor was found in a two-man scout submarine that had penetrated the harbor before being sunk on 7 December. The photocopy shows signs of deterioration from being soaked in sea water. It was translated by a Japanese-American working for the Hawaiian Department. The notations show the sub commanders route, time schedule, expected visual sightings, the normal anchorages and names of U.S. ships, the locations of coastal guns, and the width of the harbor entrance. It is one small example of the extensive contributions made to the war in the Pacific by Japanese-Americans, most of whom worked for the Allied Translation and Interrogation Service, a part of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's intelligence section.

Korea

Korea was another crisis for Army intelligence, as it was in fact for the entire post-World War II U.S. Army. General James Van Fleet, who commanded the Eighth U.S. Army from 1951 to 1953, remarked that since World War II “we have lost through neglect, disinterest, and possible jealousy, much of the effectiveness in intelligence work that we acquired so painfully in World War II.”

During the Korean War little in the way of national level signals intelligence was intercepted because of the low priority that had been accorded to North Korea in the postwar code-breaking efforts. But tactical signal intelligence (that collected on the ground on the Korean peninsula) was credited with saving General Walton Walker’s Eighth Army during the last ditch stand in the Pusan Perimeter. Because his signal intelligence told him in advance of every North Korean planned attack, he was able to shift his meager reserves to the critical points to strengthen his defenses. While the North Korean Army was lax in protect-

ing its communications from intercept, the U.S. Army maintained good communications security using the reliable M-209 Code Converter in its tactical message centers.

After overcoming a critical shortage of photo interpreters early in the war, by 1952 the Eighth Army G-2 was asking for 3,000 negatives a day at

truce talks dragged on, Eighth Army received 64,657 negatives covering 129,314 square miles of the theater of operations, but the supply never matched the appetite of the ground commanders for low-level, oblique photography that could show them what they faced.

In Korea, General Douglas MacArthur retained

for the war on the Korean peninsula.

The commander’s tools in the Korea fighting were limited to prisoner interrogation and aerial reconnaissance. There was little in the way of SIGINT. Allied commanders were also hamstrung by the prohibition of overflights or agent penetrations beyond the Yalu, into Chinese territory. This blinded them to the size and imminence of the Chinese intervention.

For military intelligence, the Korean War was fought in World War II terms. Little had changed in the intelligence arena in either technology or organization. But the war would provoke postwar appraisals and result in some important changes in intelligence organization and professionalism. The changes took hold just in time for another war in Asia.

Detachments of MI specialists, CIC, and ASA personnel were attached to each division. As they were in World War II, 17-man CIC detachments were assigned to each division and they



a 1:3,000 scale, while the Air Force’s 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing could only deliver 2,400 a day flown at higher altitudes. In the last year of the war, the Air Force almost tripled the sortie rate that was flown during a comparable period in World War II, furnishing 736,684 negatives as compared to 243,175 taken in the last war. In March 1953 as

his trusted intelligence chief from World War II, Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby. “Sir Charles,” large, aloof, and still retaining traces of his German accent, played an important part in the Korean War. As the chief of intelligence for the Far East Command with headquarters in Tokyo, Willoughby would manage the multi-disciplined system

largely succeeded in protecting rear areas against enemy intelligence actions. As intelligence specialists were graduated from the Intelligence Department, they were shipped to Korea to MI units like the 500th MI Service Group and the 163d MI Service detachment which supported tactical units.

The KA-20 high resolution aircraft camera saw service in the Korean War. Aerial reconnaissance played an important role in Korea, such as delivering photos of the Inchon area prior to the landing there. The Air Force effort was hampered by the initial lack of Army photo interpreters.

Vietnam

First Lieutenant George K. Sisler served in Vietnam as an assistant intelligence officer with the 5th Special Forces Group. He was a member of a US/Republic of Vietnam exploitation force that was scouting deep in enemy territory on 7 February 1967 when they were cut off by a sizeable force of the enemy. His platoon turned back one assault

after another and finally Sisler was killed as he attacked the enemy with rifle and grenades, killing some 25 of them. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for his conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty, and became the first military intelligence officer to receive the nation's highest award.

It was during the Vietnam War that military intelligence reached a potential unparalleled in history. Using the latest electronic gear to detect the enemy, both from the air and the ground, hostile concentrations were pinpointed and enemy traps were avoided or surprised. Ground surveillance radars were employed, side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) was deployed and a variety of night observation devices were used which took advantage of infrared and image-intensification.

American involvement in Vietnam steadily increased as the instability of the South Vietnamese government led to greater possibilities of a Communist insurgent victory in the South.

Escalating from a small advisory role in 1961, the U.S. committed air power and ground forces in 1965. While the military fought on the often ill-defined battlefields of Vietnam, the politicians found themselves faced with growing anti-war sentiment at home. Army intelligence would be asked to contribute its know-how on both fronts until the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973. Following the peace agreement in January 1973, the last intelligence unit pulled out by March, ending for them what had been a mixed experience.

The early years of the war found military intelligence assets inadequate and unsophisticated, a situation which had become the pattern in every American war. In 1965 there were 200 U.S. army officers serving as intelligence advisers with Republic of Vietnam troops. When U.S. combat troops were committed in that year, the 704th Intelligence Corps Detachment, a detachment of the 500th Intelligence Corps Group, and the 3d Radio Research Unit were on duty in Vietnam.

But there were shortages of specialists, especially linguists.

But improvements were on the way. By the 1968 Tet Offensive, there were 2,500 intelligence specialists in country under the supervision of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), J-2. In Saigon the 525th Military Intelligence Group exercised command and control over the 135th MI Group, a counterintelligence unit; the 149th MI Group, which engaged in positive collection; the 1st MI Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance); and the 519th MI Battalion, which operated the joint US/RVN intelligence centers. The combined intelligence centers shared jointly gathered intelligence, translated captured documents and interrogated prisoners. There was a center at MACV and at each of the four corps areas in which the Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN) operated. There were over 600 intelligence advisers on the ground now with the RVN Army. The 509th Radio Research Group ran a field station and

provided support through its tactical units to units down to brigade level. Combat troops had their own organic intelligence assets.

Supplementing the combat information provided by the Ground Surveillance Radar, remote sensors, like this hand-employed one, can give the combat commander day and night surveillance in nearly all weather conditions. They are delivered by hand or by air in areas of expected enemy activity, such as trails. They detect movement within their range and transmit information back to remote monitoring teams.

Seismic Intrusion Detector, Air-Delivered Sensor. These Air-Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detectors (ASID, AN/GSQ-171) were dropped from helicopters in Vietnam and sent electronic signals to U.S. Army monitors when the ground vibrated. They could detect enemy movements along remote trails. (MIC0238)



Converter, M-209 Cipher. (MIC0239)

Aerial Camera, high resolution KA-30. (MIC0241)

Aerial Camera, high resolution KA-30.



The high-resolution KA-30 aerial camera was fitted in the fuselage of the first Mohawk aircraft to come off the assembly line in 1959. They saw early service in Vietnam before being replaced by the KA-60C panoramic camera and the KA-76 serial frame camera. (MIC0242)



OV-1 Mohawk, plastic model. The first unit of six OV-1 Mohawks, the Army's new surveillance plane, was deployed to Vietnam in September 1962. Initially the 23d Special Warfare Aviation De-

tachment, the unit was stationed at Nha Trang and supported U.S. Army and Republic of Vietnam Army divisions throughout the country. (Courtesy William Gardner) (MIC0243)



Transceiver, VHF, FM, Chinese, Model 889. The success of U.S. Army efforts to monitor short-range enemy communications over telephones and low-powered radios, like this Chinese model, remained limited because U.S. troops could not get close enough without jeopardizing the security of men and equipment. (MIC0115)



Barrage Jammer. Jammers, like this barrage jammer, were used in tactical situations to distort enemy communications with noise and disrupt their command and control. But jamming was seldom used because the enemy turned on their radios infrequently and battles were brief. (Courtesy Lt. Col. Terry Mitchell/Col. James Kelsey) (MIC0117)



The Apache Scout

The Apache Scout is usually thought of as falling within the category of human intelligence because of his job as a long-range recon man, but the Native Americans' skills at tracking resemble the techniques used by the imagery interpreter. Imagery Intelligence studies the earth's surface for clues to identify and locate enemy activity. Today that is accomplished mainly by photographic, radar, infrared, or electro-optic images, some conveyed from platforms in space. The Apache too scrutinized the ground for signs of enemy activity, but he gathered his images from as close to the earth's surface as you can get. Occasionally, his platform was the back of a horse.

Recon Redefined

We live in an age of

“Electronic Cavalry,” with new and powerful systems being fielded every year that dramatically increase their commanders' field of vision. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca are at the center of a technological revolution in military intelligence.

Portable Ground Surveillance Radar, AN/



PPS-5. Replacing the Indian Scout of a century ago, the three-man Ground Surveillance Radar team gives the maneuver battalion commander a highly mobile, almost all-weather, round-the-clock surveillance of the battlefield. The AN/PPS-5 can detect people moving up to three miles and can spot vehicles at over six miles, making it useful for detecting enemy move-

ments and provide early warning. The AN/PPS-5 is a portable, battery-powered, radar set used on the battlefield to locate and identify moving ground targets at ranges up to 10,000 meters. It can be mounted on a vehicle or packed on the back by three soldiers. It can be set up or taken down under blackout conditions by two persons in about ten min-

utes. (Transfer from U S A I C & F H) (MIC0074 and MIC0075)

Davis

First used in the Korean War, the **AN/PRD-1** Direction Finding Set was the workhorse during the Vietnam War for determining from what direction enemy radio signals were coming. It was made mobile by

mounting it on jeeps and trucks. It could pick up continuous wave, interrupted wave, frequency-modulated (fm) and amplitude-modulated (am) signals and, by rotating the antenna to determine where the maximum pickup was obtained, home in on enemy radio sources.

Specialist Four James T. Davis served as a 3d Radio Research Unit advisor to elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. In this capacity he participated in numerous operations in direct support of Vietnamese Army tactical forces, thereby exposing himself to danger from Viet Cong insurgents. On 22 December 1961, his team was required to go to a new position. On the way, the team was ambushed by the Viet Cong. The truck in which they were riding hit a road mine and the men were thrown from the truck. Davis was still able to function and managed to fire several rounds from his M-1 before being killed. From an investigation of the ambush area and an interview with a survivor, it was obvious that Davis died defending his com-

rades. He was the first American intelligence soldier to be killed in the Vietnam War.

Nicholson Hall Display

“Villa Nicholson” Plaque. Displayed on the U.S. Military Liaison Mission House after the death of Major Nicholson. It was removed on the completion of USMLM’s mission in 1989. (Transfer from USAREUR) (MIC0093)



License Plate, U.S. Military Liaison Mission. From one of the vehicles driven by Lt. Col. Nicholson in the conduct of his duties with the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in the Soviet zone, headquartered at Potsdam, East Germany. (Transferred from USAREUR) (MIC0094)

US Military Liaison Patch. This shoulder sleeve insignia was worn by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission

staff. (Transferred from U S A R E U R) (MIC0095)



Original 7893 USMLM unit crest. Displayed at the U.S. Military Liaison Mission



headquarters in Potsdam, East Germany. (Transferred from U S A R E U R) (MIC0096)



Soviet Identification Cards. These IDs were issued to Lt. Col. Mark

D. Beto on 6 November 1988. Beto was the last operations officer at the U.S. Military Liaison Mission. (Transfer from USAREUR) (MIC0099 and MIC0100)



Huachuca in 1974 where it has stood in front of buildings 82105, 51005 and Rodney Hall in 1993. (MIC0126)



Outdoor Equipment Park

Mohawk aircraft, model OV-1D. (Transfer from USAIC&FH) The first unit of six OV-1 Mohawks, the Army’s new surveillance plane, was deployed to Vietnam in September 1962. Initially the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment, the unit was stationed at Nha Trang and supported U.S. Army and Republic of Vietnam Army divisions throughout the country. (MIC0057)

In Storage

Electronic Equipment Cabinets that were used in various con-

In Front of Rodney Hall

Sphinx of Thebes sculpture. This symbol of U.S. Army military intelligence originally stood in front of the 525th MI Battalion, Fort George G. Meade; relocated to Fort Holabird in 1952; dedicated in 1962; relocated to Fort

figurations at Field Stations around the globe. Casualties of the Cold War, these electronic listening posts no longer had any utility after the end of the Cold War. (Transferred from the Fort Devens Intelligence School) (MIC0002-MIC0056)

Morse Code Teaching Console, used at Fort Devens to train Morse code intercept, the console features real-time, computer-aided instruction used by the Army Security Agency. (Transferred from the Fort Devens Intelligence School) (MIC0058)

Morse Code Training Console. A two-position work station used to train students in Morse code intercept at Fort Devens. It was a real-time, computer-aided instructional system used in the 1970s. (Transferred from Fort Devens) (MIC0059)

Morse Code Trainer, GTE Sylvania. (Transferred from Fort Devens) (MIC0060)

Flag, 2d Military Intelligence Battalion. This unit, part of the 207th

MI Brigade, was first constituted in 1961 and inactivated with its parent brigade in 1992. It served with distinction in the Gulf War. (Transfer from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0063)

Flag, 207th Military Intelligence Brigade. This unit which first saw action in the Gulf War was inactivated on 8 January 1992 at Fort Huachuca. (Transfer from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0064)

Flag, 307th Military Intelligence Battalion. A subordinate unit of the 207th MI Brigade, the 307th was first constituted in 1951 and inactivated in 1992 along with its parent unit. It was service in World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. (Transfer from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0065)

Flag, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion. Part of the 207th MI Brigade, the unit was inactivated in January 1992 after serving in the Gulf War. (Transfer from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0066)

Still Camera, Model

OM-2S. Used by Human Intelligence collectors to gather intelligence information. (Transferred from U S A I C & F H) (MIC0068)

Keyer, Model TG-34-A. (MIC0073)

Air-Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector Sensor, also known as ASIDS. Model AN/GSD-171 was air dropped on suspected enemy trails in Vietnam and monitored to locate troop movements. (Courtesy William L. Morris) (MIC0078)

S t e r e o s c o p e s . (MIC0079, MIC0080, MIC0081)

U.S. National Flag, 48-star. Used by 321st Army Security Agency. (MIC0082)

Guidon, Original U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. (MIC0083)

Flag, 112th Military Intelligence Brigade. (MIC0084)

Flag, USAFS, Korea. Flown at U.S. Army Field Station Korea. (MIC0085)

U.S. National Flag, 48-star. Flown at the 6th Army Security Agency Field Station. (MIC0086)

Flag, MI Corps. Used once at the Military Intelligence Corps activation ceremony at Fort Huachuca on 1 July 1987. (MIC0087)

Flag, US Army Field Station Korea. (MIC0088)

Flag, Soviet Union. Displayed in the "Torgau Room" of the Potsdam House, a room used for meetings between senior Soviet and American officers; the Potsdam House was maintained by the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Potsdam. Transfer from U S A R E U R) (MIC0089)

U.S. National Flag, 50-star. Donated by the Berlin Brigade after reunification of Germany on 9 November 1989. It was flown at Checkpoint Charlie in West Berlin. (MIC0090)

Amplifier Assembly, Model AM-3635A/FSQ-44. (Transferred from U.S. Army Intelli-

gence School, Fort Devens) (MIC0092)

Wrist Compass, Type 44W. This was one of the items contained in the "Tour Bag" issued to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission staff. It could be used for escape and evasion and for recording photograph orientation. (Transfer from U S A R E U R) (MIC0097)

Flashlight. A mini flashlight with a red lens filter, it was a component of the USMLM "Tour Bag." See above. (Transfer from USAREUR) (MIC0060)

Protective Mask. A model M74 Romanian, Iraqi-improved gas mask captured during Operation DESERT STORM. (Transferred from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0101)

Grenade Launcher, RPG 7, Iraqi. Captured during Operation DESERT STORM. (Transferred from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0102)

Pistol, 9mm Tariq, Model 1951. Captured during Operation DESERT STORM.

(Transferred from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0103)

Assault Rifle, 7.62x39mm, Peoples Republic of China model. (Courtesy Otto Fiedler) (MIC0104)

Assault Rifle, 7.62x39mm, Peoples Republic of China model. (Transferred from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0105)

Assault Rifle, AK-47, Soviet. Captured during Operation DESERT STORM. (Transferred from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0106)

Grenade Launcher, RPG-7B, Iraqi. Captured during Operation DESERT Storm. (Transferred from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0107)

Pistol, 9mm Tariz, Model 1982. Captured during Operation DESERT STORM. (Transferred from 207th MI Brigade) (MIC0108)

Revolver, .38 caliber. Best described as a "Saturday Night Special," this weapon was seized at the Commandancia

during Operation JUST CAUSE. It is purported to be the sidearm of General Torrijo. Donated by the Commander, 470th MI Brigade, Panama. (MIC0119)

Signs for the U.S. Military Liaison Mission. In both the English and Cyrillic versions. (Transferred by USAREUR) (MIC00109 and 0110)

Book, *Military Notes on Cuba* (1909). One of the earliest "Area Studies" published by the Second Section, War Department General Staff. (Courtesy MI Corps Museum Foundation) (MIC0120)

War Office Plaque. "In Proud memory of those members of the United States Army who died in defense of freedom." (MIC0123)

Army Forces Far East Intelligence Service Center Plaque. From U.S. Army Forces, Far East, Camp Drake, Saitama Prefecture, Japan; constructed 1952-53; AFIE Intelligence Service Center Constructed

by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Two plaques, one in English and one in Japanese. (MIC0124A&B)

"Army Intelligence School" brass plaque. (MIC0125)

Radio Transceiver, FM, Model R-105M, with accessory bag. A Soviet Army souvenir donated by German Army liaison officer to USAIC&FH. (Courtesy Ruediger F. Borke) (MIC0129A&B)

Typewriter, L.C. Smith. (Courtesy Col. Jack Pattison) (MIC0131)

Adding/Calculating Machine, Dalton. (Courtesy Col. Jack Pattison) (MIC0132)

Commander's Coins, 302d MI Battalion. Coins awarded by the 302d MI Bn commander to soldiers for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. (MIC0135A&B)

Guidon, 302d MI Battalion (TRAC). (MIC0136)

Compass, magnetic pocket. Used by Captain Carl P. Palmer while he was a World War S2. (Courtesy Carl P. Palmer) (MIC0137)

Slide, Aerial photographic data, Model 52T. Used by imagery interpreters. (MIC0140)

Regimental Crest, MI Corps. The first MI Corps regimental crest presented to Maj. Gen. Julius Parker, Jr., the first chief of the MI Corps, on 1 July 1987. (Transferred from U S A I C & F H) (MIC0142)

Badge Holder for CIC credentials. Used by Counter Intelligence Corps agents between 1950 and 1971. (Courtesy David O. Hale) (MIC0145)

Flag, 714th MI Battalion. (Transferred from 714th MI Battalion) (MIC0148)

Flag, 713d MI Battalion. (Transferred from 714th MI Battalion) (MIC0149)

Flag, 1st Operations, Field Station

Augsburg. (Transferred from 714th MI Battalion) (MIC0150)

Flag, 2d Operations, Field Station

Augsburg. (Transferred from 714th MI Battalion) (MIC0151)

Guidon, H Company, 305th MI Battalion. (Transferred from 111th MI Brigade) (MIC0152)

Commemorative Plaque, Army Intelligence and Security. Commemorates the establishment of Army Intelligence and Security Branch of the U.S. Army, July 1962***Career Course, 1963. (MIC0153)

Radio Receivers, Model R-1808(V)4R. A pair of platoon early warning systems. (MIC0156 and MIC0157)

Jammers, Hand-Emplaced, Expendable. (MIC0158 and MIC0159)

Jammers, portable. (MIC0160 and MIC0161)

"Enemy Action." Artwork by an Army artist named Williams, sketched at an unidentified ASA field station during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0162)

Field Telephones. (MIC0163 and MIC0164)

"USASA Ground Maintenance." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0165)

"Breakdown." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0166)

"Ceflien Lion." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0167)

"Antenna Array." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0168)

"Time-Out." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0169)

"Morning Mission." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0170)

"407 RR Det." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0171)

"Final Echelon." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0172)

"Pre-Flight Check." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0173)

"Writing Home." Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0174)

ferred from
INSCOM)
(MIC0174)

“Patrol, Man and Dog.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0175)

“Teletype.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0176)

“Found It.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0177)

“Courier.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0178)

“ARVN Hill.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0179)

“DF Operator.”

Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0180)

“Setting Up.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0181)

“Checking the Antennas.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0182)

“His Basic Weapon.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0183)

“Protection.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0184)

“Portrait.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Trans-

ferred from
INSCOM)
(MIC0185)

“Interrogation.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0186)

“Orphan’s Day.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0187)

“U-8.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0188)

“DF Device.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0189)

“Company Street.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0190)

Camera, Aircraft Torpedo, Type I.

(MIC0191)

“Chatterboxes.” Artwork by an Army artist made during the Vietnam War. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0192)

Jammer, UHF Applique. (Transferred from INSCOM) (MIC0193)

“The MI Blue Rose.” The back of this painting indicates Sgt. Abel did this at USAICS, Winter 1988-89. Transfer from USAIC&FH) (MIC0194)

Hat, campaign. (Courtesy Carl P. Palmer) (MIC0195)

Cap, garrison. (Courtesy Carl P. Palmer) (MIC0196)

Helmet liner. (Courtesy Carl P. Palmer) (MIC0197)

Decontamination Kit, Yugoslavian/Iraqi, Model LPD. Captured during Operation DESERT STORM. (Transferred from Foreign Materials Intelligence

Battalion) (MIC0199)	ion. (Transfer from USAICS) (MIC0205)	Badge Holder for CIC credentials. (Courtesy George D. Hackenyos) (MIC0213)	Holbrook) (MIC0221)
Booklet, Notes on Panama No. 1. This document was produced by the Military Information Division, 2d Division, War Department in 1903. It was originally classified "Confidential." (Courtesy Richard T. Eltzroth) (MIC0200)	Guidon, H Company, 2d MI Battalion. (Transfer from USAICS) (MIC0206)	Identification Holder for CIC. Used by Counter Intelligence Corps agents between 1950 and 1971. (Courtesy George D. Hackenyos) (MIC0214)	Cipher Device, M-138A. (Courtesy Thomas R. Whipp) (MIC0222)
Book, <i>Organisationsbuch der NSDAP.</i> German language manual to the organization and activities of the Nazi Party. (Courtesy Richard T. Eltzroth) (MIC0201)	East German National Flag. Presented by the Berlin Brigade on 9 November 1984, a Cold War trophy acquired before the reunification of East and West Germany. (MIC0207)	G2 Sign Board for the 5th Infantry Division. (Courtesy Lt. Col. Brooks) (MIC0215)	Map, silk, invasion of France. (Courtesy Robert Blanchard) (MIC0237)
	Banner, INSCOM. (MIC0208)		Flag, U.S. national, 48 stars. Flown over internment camp in Hawaii commanded by Carl Eifler during World War II. (Courtesy Carl Eifler) (MIC0244)
	Flag, Romanian National. (MIC0209)	Code Wheel, KAL 55B. (MIC0216)	Sword, edged. (MIC0245)
	Flag, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens. (Transferred from Cdr, Fort Devens) (MIC0210)	Patches, Military Intelligence Center and School, 1971. (Courtesy Paul E. Holbrook) (MIC0217 and 0218)	Bayonets, Swedish Mauser. (Courtesy Swedish Army Chief of Staff) (MIC0246 and 0247)
Guidon, Hq Co, 1st MI Battalion, USAICS. (Transfer from USAICS) (MIC0202)		Patch, Army Ground Force. (Courtesy Paul E. Holbrook) (MIC0219)	Throwing Knives, Ghurka, with scabbards. (Courtesy Col. Carl Eifler) (MCA0248a, b, c, d, g, e, f, g)
Guidon, D Company, 2d MI Battalion, USAICS. (Transfer from USAICS) (MIC0203)	Flag, with Military Intelligence Crest. Used by the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens. (Transferred from Cdr, Fort Devens) (MIC0211)	Insignia, Military Intelligence Reserve. (Courtesy Paul E. Holbrook) (MIC0220)	Map, World War I. (Courtesy Daniel Kessler) (MIC0249)
Guidon, E Company, 2d MI Battalion. (Transfer from USAICS) (MIC0204)	Flag, U.S. Army ASA School. (Transferred from Cdr, Fort Devens) (MIC0212)	Insignia, U.S. Army Intelligence Branch. (Courtesy Paul E.	Combination Lock, 8500 Series. (Courtesy Intelligence
Guidon, G Company, 2d MI Battal-			

Materiel Division)
(MIC0250)

Combination Lock, CD-X07, Electronic.
(Courtesy Intelligence Materiel Division)
(MIC0251)

Logo for MI Service Language School.
Tech Sgt. Chris Ishii, former Disney studio artist was the creator of the logo. The significance of the war bonnet of the chief was an Army camp in Lakota Indian territory. The gopher was the state animal of Minnesota where the MI Service Language School was located at Forts Savage and then Snelling. (Courtesy Col. Harry Fukuhara and Harry Akune)
(MIC0252)

Sign, "U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Headquarters." (Transferred from U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens)
(MIC0253)

Bayonet. (Courtesy Swedish Army Chief of Staff) (MIC0254)

Flag, Field Station Vint Hill Farms,

Army Security Agency. (Transferred from Vint Hill Historical Holding)
(MIC0256)

Wood carving, Ainu, of a bear with CIC on the side and the number six on top. (Courtesy Waino Remes) (MIC0257)

Hat, officers dress. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. His biography follows: Survivor of Bataan Death March and Prisoner of War during World War II. Intelligence career began in 1947 as student at Strategic Intelligence School, followed by tours as an Army Attache, and Staff Officer in Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. Later served as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army. In latter role, he was instrumental in the creation of the Military Intelligence Branch in 1962. Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. A distin-

guished member of the MI Corps. U.S. Military Academy Class of 1930 (8879) Extract from Register of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy, 1980: Born in Nebraska, 10 September 1907; FA; Commander, 9th Battalion, 91st Field Artillery (Philippine Army) and Battery A, 23rd Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts, Bataan (Distinguished Service Cross-Silver Star-Bronze Star Medal-Purple Heart); Prisoner of War, 1942 to 1945; Death March; Armed Forces Staff College, 1951; OG2, 1951 to 1952; Executive Officer, 9th Corps Artillery, Korean War, 1952 to 1953 (Legion of Merit); Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Belgium, 1957 to 1959 (Legion of Merit); Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 1959 to 1966; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, 1961 to 1964; Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1964 to 1965 (Distinguished Service Medal); retired (with disability) in 1966 as a Lt. Gen.; Military Edi-

tor, Kiplinger Publications, 1966. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch)
(MIC0258)

Hat, officers dress. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0259)

Name Tags. (Courtesy Major Carl P. Palmer) (MIC0260)

Shoulder patch for Intelligence Center Pacific. (Courtesy Major Carl P. Palmer)
(MIC0261)

Crest, INSCOM.
(Courtesy Major Carl P. Palmer) (MIC0262)

Medal, United Nations Service.
Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch)
(MIC0263)

Medal, United Nations, Korea.
Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch)
(MIC0264)

Medal, Purple Heart.

Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0265)

Medal, Prisoner of War. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0266)

Medal, American Defense Service. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0267)

Medal, Legion of Merit, Legionnaire. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0268)

Medal, Distinguished Service, Army. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0269)

Medal, National Defense Service. Belonged to Lt.. Gen.

Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0270)

Medal, Asiatic-Pacific Campaign. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0271)

Medal, World War II Victory. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0272)

Medal, Defense of Philippines. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0273)

Medal, Silver Star. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0274)


Medal, Distinguished Service Cross, Army. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch)

(MIC0275)

Medal, Luxembourg, Grand Officer de L'Ordne Grand-Ducal de la Couranne de Chene. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0277)

Medal, Order of Vasco Nunez de Balboa. Belonged to Lt.. Gen. Alva Fitch, a member of the MI Hall of Fame. (Courtesy Mrs. Alva R. Fitch) (MIC0278)

The Army's Values



LeaDeRSHIP

It was Thomas Carlyle who formulated the idea of movers and shakers in history. In *Heroes and Hero Worship* he said, "No great man lives in vain. The history of the world is but the biography of great men." History as biography is an idea that has great persuasiveness for it corrects a common misrepresentation. History is often thought of as an inexorable force sweeping all before it with an inevitability over which we have no control. History as a sum of individual biographies restores the notion of individuals making a difference. It is the personal ideas, commitments and actions of singular men and women that chart the course of human events. So it becomes important to ask what did our forebears think and do. To what system of values did they subscribe and how did those values prepare them for history-changing decisions.

One way of evaluating the movers and shakers of U.S. Army military intelligence would be to hold them up to the light of those values which the U.S. Army of the year 2000 says are at the core of what the U.S. Army is all about. There are seven and they spell out the load-bearing letters of the word "leadership." Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage. While hardly exhausting the admirable qualities of military men of the past, these seven virtues are thought by the Army of today to be at the heart of the U.S. Army's character. They are the superstructure around which each successive landing in the Army's history is built. The character of Army men and women is largely upheld by these seven girders. Let us turn to some of the fuglemen of military intelligence to see what part these values played in their lives.

Looking at some of the heroes of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps, the core values of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage begin to take on a human face. In the capsule biographies that follow, we see examples of men and women from diverse races and creeds making lasting contributions to their country, the U.S. Army, and the military intelligence profession. Each exemplifies the values that are enumerated above.

* * *

One of the Army's core values is *Loyalty*, that allegiance which we pledge to our family, friends, organization, and country. It constitutes a kind of fidelity to

the groups we have chosen to join. There is no better example of the characteristic of loyalty than the career of Colonel Arthur L. Wagner. By the time Wagner took on his first intelligence assignment, he had already earned a reputation as a military thinker and advocate of professional education within the U.S. Army. Promoted to major in 1896, he became head of the Military Information Division of the Adjutant General's Office, the embryo intelligence organization for the U.S. Army. There he directed the collection of intelligence in preparation for the Spanish-American War, doing research and sending officers on clandestine missions into Cuba and Puerto Rico, and administered the military attache system until 1898 when he was reassigned to the staff of Nelson A. Miles, the Major General commanding the Army. One of the young officers he left behind to continue the intelligence gathering in the Military Information Division was Lieutenant Ralph Van Deman.

Wagner recommended to General Miles and the Secretary of War that the invasion of Cuba be delayed for a number of reasons, the chief one being that it was scheduled for the season of the year when yellow fever was rampant. Russell A. Alger, the Secretary of War, disagreed with Wagner. According to an account written by Van Deman many years later, the Secretary of War turned to Wagner and said, "Colonel Wagner, you have made it impossible for my plan of campaign to be carried out. I will see to it that you do not receive any promotions..." According to Van Deman, Wagner jeopardized his career in order to satisfy a sense of loyalty to the U.S. Army, rather than bow to political pressure. Information that indicated that soldier's lives could be saved by avoiding the worst time of the year for yellow fever was more important to him than winning favor with the Secretary of War.

* * *

Consider the word *Duty*. It implies that we have a moral obligation to a social entity larger than ourselves, that we owe something to our nation. It is a concept that has been around since the earliest days of the U.S. Army. It was during the Revolutionary War that the commander-in-chief, George Washington, realized that he desperately needed intelligence on the British movements and formed an elite recon unit named after its leader—Thomas Knowlton. When Washington needed a man in the British camp to determine their intentions, it was from the ranks of Knowlton's Rangers that Nathan

Hale stepped forward. We all know about his fate. At a public hanging at first light on September 22, 1776, Nathan Hale was led to the gallows. His last words were reported to be “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country!” The British Provost ordered “Swing the rebel off!” and Captain Hale’s life was forfeited for the sake of military intelligence.

The Nathan Hale story, aside from being an inspirational example of the idea of duty, is revealing of an essential truth about intelligence work. It entails grave risk, an obvious and tragic fact that can be seen as the military intelligence honor roll unfurls over the next two centuries, inscribed with too many names following that of Nathan Hale and ending, at this writing, with Sgt. Kenneth Hobson who was killed in the bombing of the American embassy on September 1998.

* * *

Respect, the third of the core values, encompasses a regard for the dignity of others and would naturally include compassion, sensitivity and fairness extended to other humans in our sphere. A brief story will illustrate how one MI leader respected the enlisted men in his charge. Air Force General George Goddard is best remembered as the pioneer of aerial reconnaissance. Almost every technological improvement in aerial photography over his lifetime can be traced to his inventiveness. From the time of his enlistment during World War I until the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, he was energetically promoting the worth of his craft. In 1929 he returned from a tour in the Philippines to take over as the Director of the School of Photography, Air Corps Technical Command. It was while running the school that Goddard ran across many promising enlisted men who he encouraged to attend college. One of them, Private “Red” Nelson, could not afford the cost of higher education so Goddard loaned him Air Corps cameras and lab equipment so that he could work his way through school as a photographer. He graduated as an honor student and became successful in military and civilian aviation. George Goddard did more than pay lip service to the notion of respect.

* * *

Another in the list of core values that the Army Chief of Staff has set down for us is *Selfless Service*, a phrase which needs no further definition. If you need amplification of that phrase, you need not look any further than the man who has been called the Father of

Military Intelligence—Ralph Van Deman. He was a highly educated man, a product of Harvard Law School and a holder of a medical degree from Miami University. It makes one wonder why he sought and received a commission in the infantry in 1891 and allowed himself to be sidetracked into a career in military intelligence. We will never know how he would have fared as a doctor or lawyer. But as an intelligence officer, he was destined to be remembered by all belonging to that military specialty as “The Father of American Military Intelligence.” He labored for most of his career in obscurity, advocating unsuccessfully for a real military intelligence division within the War Department. After failing to convince the Army leadership time and again of the importance of intelligence, he finally succeeded on the eve of World War I in having established a separate Military Intelligence Service which was organized in May 1917. The work the Military Intelligence Section accomplished during the war was far-reaching. Under Van Deman’s able leadership, this Military Intelligence Service evolved in a matter of months into the first national level intelligence organization. It supported both domestic and tactical intelligence. Van Deman had ultimately accomplished his goal of restoring intelligence to equal footing with the other general staff sections in the War Department, as had originally been envisioned in 1903.

He believed in an idea, the soundness of which was inescapable. It was his belief in service before self that enabled him to risk his entire career for the greater goal of saving American lives in the fighting in Europe.

* * *

Honor is that military virtue which has reflected brilliantly off the coat of arms of the MI profession. The history of military intelligence within the U.S. Army is replete with examples of men and women who have brought honor upon themselves, their armed forces, the MI Corps and the nation which they serve.

The lessons General John J. Pershing learned about the value of military intelligence during the 1916 Punitive Expedition caused him to place great reliance upon this tool during World War I when he commanded the American Expeditionary Force and organized a G2 section along French and British examples. An intelligence section existed in every battalion and higher command. To organize and head his AEF G2 section, Pershing selected a 45-year old colonel of infantry who had distinguished himself in the fighting around Santiago,

Cuba, in 1898, and who had experience with the Military Information Division in 1905 as a captain. Dennis E. Nolan was a former West Point instructor and a friend of Ralph Van Deman. Nolan was the first U.S. Army officer to be called the “G2,” and he had the widest span of intelligence responsibilities that had ever been seen in the American Army until that time.

General Pershing said of Nolan’s work, “the importance [of intelligence] can hardly be overestimated. The successful operation of an army in the field depends upon the accuracy of its information regarding the situation and probable intentions of the enemy. General Nolan carefully studied the systems in vogue in the allied armies and selected the best features of each, with the result that no army was better served by its intelligence bureau that was our own.”

Joseph Stilwell was one of those rare examples of a trained intelligence officer who rose to high rank and command of combat troops. (Dennis Nolan had held high command after World War I as did Ralph Van Deman, but neither commanded troops in combat.) He may have succeeded in that achievement by recognizing that power wielding is not the same as leadership. For Stilwell, leadership was all about character. Character could be defined here as the sum of a person’s values, those to which he not just pays lip service, but by which he lives. What he had to say about leadership still resonates in manuals several decades later and his experience can be instructive for today’s Military Intelligence officer for what it tells him about the leadership side of his calling.

During World War II, G2s were trying to gain the confidence of their commanders. Assigned as George Patton’s G2 for almost the entire war, Oscar Koch was one of those intelligence officers who made a difference in most combat operations and who midwived the tactical intelligence art as it is known to modern warfare. His opinion was sought by Patton and other staffers in Third Army and his soft-spoken, diligent, prudent, and consistently on-the-money estimates won for him the confidence of his commander. In that war Patton is remembered as one of the sole risk-takers among the allied leadership. The risks were enabled and, to some degree, ameliorated by the good intelligence provided by Koch. Up until that time, World War II was the war in which intelligence gained its greatest acceptance among the allied nations, and, not surprisingly, its greatest triumphs.

Koch was one of the reasons why. It is fair to say that both Patton, the commander, and Koch, the G2, learned from and complimented one another during the course of their long staff relationship. Perhaps just as importantly, Koch attempted with some success to pass the intelligence lessons down to future generations of intelligence specialists when he headed the Intelligence Department of the Fort Riley Army Ground School after the war.

* * *

Integrity is that quality of moral rectitude without which leadership cannot take place. The military intelligence corps has as its model of integrity Gen. George Washington, the man who could not tell a lie. Leaders who followed in Washington’s tradition of high moral character are legion. Recent years alone have witnessed a series of MI officers who exemplify integrity with the MI Corps. They are men like Maj. Gen. Joe McChristian, who championed the idea of an Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, and a string of commanders who are well known to anyone who has served at Fort Huachuca in the last quarter of the 20th century. They are men and women like: Major Generals Sidney T. Weinstein, Julius Parker, Jr., Paul E. Menoher, Jr., John F. Stewart, Jr., Charles W. Thomas, John D. Thomas, and Lt. Gen. Claudia Kennedy.

* * *

Personal Courage, that military virtue that enables us to conquer fear and adversity, is the third entry on our scroll of values. Examples of it are everywhere on the landscape of American military history, but none more striking than the courage of Sergeants Daniel Bissell, Michael Maslak, and Roy Matsumoto. They were intelligence NCOs.

It was during the revolutionary war that NCOs distinguished themselves in units like Thomas Knowlton’s Rangers, the first intelligence unit, and as daring behind-the-lines operatives. Daniel Bissell was 20 years old when he enlisted in the Continental Army in 1775. He served in the 8th, 5th, and 2d Connecticut Regiments and by 1781 he had been promoted to the rank of sergeant. General George Washington, a man who well knew the advantages of military intelligence, put in motion an espionage mission to discover the intentions of the British General Cornwallis encamped around the city of New York. Sergeant Bissell was his man. He was to pose as a deserter from the American Army and to guarantee his

cover he was written off the rolls of his regiment. Crossing into British lines, he discovered that General Harry Clinton had rescinded his orders to give protection to American deserters. Suffering from exposure and fever as a result of eluding British press gangs, Bissell enlisted in the British Army in order to receive medical attention. Before he could fully recover, he feared he would be found out and made a harrowing escape, leading his pursuers and their bloodhounds through swamps until he reached the safety of Washington's lines on 29 September 1781.

The commission that General Washington promised him failed to materialize as Congress had put a ceiling on the number of officers in the Continental Army. Bissell was offered a discharge or transfer to the Invalid Corps with pension, but refused both and returned to his regiment as an Orderly Sergeant. On 10 June 1783 Sergeant Bissell received the Badge of Military Merit (the "Purple Heart") for conspicuous gallantry and outstanding military merit. Thus he became one of the first American soldiers to receive the new nation's first military decoration. But Bissell's military career was far from over. After the War of the Revolution, he campaigned against Indians along the Ohio River, fought against the French in 1799 as a first lieutenant, and commanded Fort Massac on the Ohio River in 1804. He would also command part of the province of Louisiana after its purchase from the French, and lead American troops in the battle of Lyon's Creek during the War of 1812. Having achieved the rank of general in 1814, he commanded posts at Mobile, New Orleans and Baton Rouge before his retirement in 1821.

World War II was the U.S. Army's first real SIGINT war. We all know about the dramatic work done by William Friedman and his crew in breaking the Japanese PURPLE codes and the importance of the ULTRA breakthrough in the European theater. But as decisive as that work was, it does not altogether overshadow the heroism of those soldiers out in the field who were engaged in intercept work in the face of enemy fire. Michael Maslak began his career as a signal intelligence soldier at the outbreak of World War II. He joined the Army in April 1939 and was trained at Fort Monmouth in fixed-station operations. When the war with Japan began in 1941, he was on duty in the Philippines with Detachment 6 of the Second Signal Service Company. When the Japanese captured Corregidor, the

last stand of the U.S. Army in the Philippines, Maslak and his fellow SIGINTers decided to take to the hills rather than giving themselves up and becoming prisoners of war. With the cash they had with them, they bought a small banca, a 30-foot dugout canoe used to transport rice along the coast. On the afternoon of 10 June 1942 they set sail for Darwin, Australia, some 1,700 miles away. The unlikely crew consisted of Maslak, Cpl. Irving A. Stein, Pfc. Stanley W. Kapp, all of Detachment 6, Capt. George Lindahl, a field artillery officer, Sgt. J. D. Biss of the U.S. Air Corps, and three Filipinos who said they wanted to fight against the Japanese with the American forces.

They endured storms, swamping, cramped quarters, ripped sails, a waterlogged compass, and exposure during their 28 days at sea. Twice they encountered Japanese ships. On these occasions the Americans would hug the bottom of the dugout, leaving only the Filipinos in sight. Navigating mostly by the stars, they spotted land on the morning of 8 July. It was not Australia, but New Guinea. They landed on a small unnamed island where on 24 September 1942 they were taken prisoner by the Japanese and spent the rest of the war in a prison camp in the Netherlands, East Indies. There Cpl. Stein and Pfc. Kapp died in 1944 from exposure, disease and starvation. Lindahl, Biss and Maslak survived and were liberated in September of that year. The fate of their Filipino fellow travelers is not known. His daring escapade over, it was time to go back to work. Four months later Maslak was reassigned to Arlington Hall Station to resume his SIGINT duties with the Second Signal Service Battalion as a staff sergeant. He had added a richer meaning to the phrase "Personal Courage."

Sgt. Roy Matsumoto's honor had been insulted when he and his family were interned in the Jerome, Arkansas, Relocation Center at the beginning of the war. To prove his patriotism, he volunteered for service in the U.S. Army and, because of his bilingual abilities, was sent for intelligence training at the language school at Camp Savage, Minnesota.

He was one of a fourteen-man team assigned as intelligence liaison with the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), also known as Merrill's Marauders. There were two men assigned to each combat team. While his unit was deep into Japanese-held territory, a single telephone cable was spotted high in the jungle canopy. It turned out to be the only line of communications be-

tween Japanese headquarters and its front line units. Matsumoto did not have any wiretapping equipment, so he borrowed the only telephone handset in the battalion belonging to the Heavy Weapons Platoon, unscrewed the mouthpiece so that he could not be heard, and improvised his own wire tap high in a tree. That he was able to understand the Kyushu dialect being spoken was the result of a coincidence of his youth when he got a job in a produce market and became intent on imitating the dialect of the Kyushu islanders that worked there. The other Japanese American with the unit did not understand the dialect, so it became Matsumoto's unenviable task to sit up in that tree for 14-hour stretches.

It was worth it. The information he intercepted was invaluable. Ammunition, so precious a commodity when it has to be shouldered up a treacherous jungle trail, was secreted by the Japanese in the dense undergrowth. The intelligence sergeant learned its location and the Marauders blew it up. When the Americans were to come under attack, Matsumoto gave them advance notice and the time to set a trap for the attackers. His contributions were by no means limited to this incident of communications intelligence. His repeated penetrations of Japanese lines and dramatic heroics later earned for him the Legion of Merit from Gen. Joe Stilwell and a Bronze Star for valor. But were it not for his imaginative wire tap, his entire company could have been wiped out and the course of the war in that theater altered.

The allies called her "an inspiration," the French partisans called her *la dame que boite* (the limping lady), and the German Gestapo called her code name Artemis, "one of the most dangerous Allied agents in France." She was Virginia Hall, a diminutive, almost frail, girl from Baltimore, Maryland. Educated at Barnard College in New York, and the Vienna Academy of Arts and Sciences, she pursued a career with the U.S. State Department in Poland and Estonia. It was while on a hunting trip in Turkey that a careless fellow hunter shot her in the leg, causing its eventual amputation. For the rest of her life she would wear a wooden leg. Hall took up a career in journalism, covering the European beat from Paris. When the war seemed imminent, she fled to Spain where she met a British agent for the Special Operations Executive, the forerunner of the Office of Strategic Services, and repeatedly volunteered for perilous undercover work in France. At first rejected because of her handicap and fragile appearance, her determination and abilities

won out. An OSS operative reported to Maj. Gen. William Donovan, the head of the OSS, that Hall's "courage and enthusiasm" were of the highest order, and that never had she "allowed her handicap to interfere with her work." Parachuting into France in March 1944 with her false leg under her arm, she initially worked as a radio operator, then as an organizer of Free French operations. She provided valuable information to the allies and her secret reports are just one of the factors that allowed the 12th U.S. Army Group to trap so much of the German Army in the Falaise Pocket. Along with the partisans, she was responsible for the rescue, shelter, and evacuation of downed allied flyers. The commander of the U.S. Army Air Force 100th Bomb Group's 350th Squadron, Major Robert Rosenthal wrote after the war: "When we force landed from damage to our B-17 after a bombing raid over Nurnberg, we heard that an American Woman spy had directed our rescue and return to England. I later learned that she was Virginia Hall and that she had similarly saved dozens of other downed bomber crews."

Less appreciative of her operations was the SS intelligence chief, Col. Heinz Jost, who told his organization, "The woman who limps is one of the most dangerous Allied agents in France and we must find and destroy her." After the German surrender, Gen. Donovan awarded her the Distinguished Service Cross, an unprecedented recognition for a civilian. She spurned a ceremony in the Truman White House, preferring to receive her medal in the privacy of Donovan's office. She married one of the men in the French resistance and settled in Barnesville, Maryland, until her death in January 1982 at the age of 77.

Courage often comes in various forms and one of those is maintaining a deep personal conviction in the face of overwhelming adversity. Let me tell you about another junior intelligence soldier in another of America's wars who was demonstrating his quick wit to the advantage of a city full of innocent civilians. His exploits have a special poignancy for me because he was a brother soldier in the same outfit that I served at a similar time. During the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, Pfc. Edward W. Minnock, Jr., was a 19-year-old intelligence analyst assigned to the 404th Radio Research Detachment, attached to the 173^d Airborne Brigade. He supervised four other privates in a tent in the almost abandoned village of Phu Hiep, just a few miles south of Tuy

Hoa City. From there he monitored enemy communications for the entire Phu Yen province. He was cut off from his higher headquarters by geography and could communicate with his chain of command only by hitchhiking rides to An Khe.

By 31 March, Minnock's analysis of a fresh radio traffic pattern convinced him that the North Vietnamese Army was planning a major attack on Tuy Hoa city with its population now swollen to 100,000 by civilian refugees and its prison full of communist prisoners taken during the Tet Offensive. His problem now was to convey his certainty to the chain of command. Changes in leadership had severed his formerly easy access to the brigade commander. His own detachment commander was not at Pleiku with the main body of the 404th, and out of Minnock's range. He could report only to a quartermaster colonel who commanded the Rear Area Command around Tuy Hoa. That officer was not cleared for Special Intelligence, nor interested in the opinions of a private first class. He dismissed the intelligence specialist with an admonition to use proper command channels in the future. Without the support of any senior intelligence officer, Minnock felt cut off. He knew the situation was fast becoming critical with the 95th NVA regiment poised to attack. He knew they would avoid the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Infantry Brigade, which was the only U.S. Army unit in the area. The only other allied unit was the 26th Republic of Korea Regiment that was moving out for operations elsewhere in the province.

The crises clearly called for some creative thinking on the intelligence soldier's part and the course Minnock chose entailed a great amount of risk. He presented himself directly to the colonel commanding the ROK regiment and outlined his case. It is interesting to note that Minnock was not wearing any rank insignia at this interview, a circumstance he called common in the 173d with its supply problems. The ROK commander would later refer to him as the "captain of American intelligence." Upon hearing Minnock's story, the ROK colonel seized the opportunity, canceling his other operations and positioning his forces on the flanks of the presumed NVA route of march. Minnock's analysis had been dead on target, even to the time of the attack. While the Pfc. And an American battalion S2 called in artillery on the NVA headquarters and staging areas, the 26th ROK hit the approaching enemy hard, virtually destroy-

ing the 95th NVA regiment and saving the city of Tuy Hoa from massive casualties.

For his initiative in a complex combat situation, he was awarded the Legion of Merit, the only private soldier to receive this award normally reserved for high ranking officers or Sergeants Major for serving in positions of exceptional responsibility. When notifying Minnock of the recommendation, the commanding general was remembered to have put his arm around Minnock's shoulders and telling him: [and remember I am quoting] "You did what the colonels should have done, you made the difference. Had you been wrong, we would have had your balls. You deserve a colonel's reward." Minnock left the Army as a Specialist Five in 1970 to go back to school, and received his PhD. in continuing education from Kansas State University in 1986. He left behind a unique example of that kind of personal courage that finds expression in desperate times and is characterized by a willingness to sacrifice all for your fellow soldiers.

Pericles was talking about the greatness of Athens when he made his famous speech in 431 B.C., but his words are the underpinning of our Army Values training and commemorations at Fort Huachuca. He reminds us: "Remember that this greatness was won by men with courage, with knowledge of their duty, and with a sense of honor in action. ... Their story is not graven only on stone over their native earth, but lives on far away, woven into the stuff of other men's lives." The principles which we have chosen to guide our lives because we believe them to be true and good, are the same virtues that have guided our most admired forebears. Their faith in a system of values lives on in our lives and confirms our purpose. We share not only the values bequeathed by our predecessors but are bound to them by biography.

“History Hunt” Exercise

Directions to student: Complete this history hunt and turn it in to your instructor. Fill in the blanks with your answer or missing words, or circle the best answer among the multiple choices. All of the answers are found in the U.S. Army Intelligence Museum.

1. In what year did the Counter Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Md., become The Army Intelligence School? _____. When did it move to Fort Huachuca? _____.
2. Charles Young was a cavalryman, the first African-American field grade officer, and a key leader during the 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico. He is also distinguished by these facts:
 - a. He was an accomplished linguist, speaking Latin, Greek, French, Spanish and German.
 - b. He served as a professor of military science at Wilberforce University in Ohio.
 - c. He graduated from West Point in 1889.
 - d. All of the above.
3. Arthur L. Wagner wrote the first text in the U.S. Army on military intelligence. It was titled The Service of Security and Information.
4. Why is Col. Ralph H. Van Deman generally regarded as the “Father of Military Intelligence?”
 - a. He served in the Philippines in intelligence assignments.
 - b. He worked at the Military Intelligence Division for Col. Arthur Wagner.
 - c. He urged the Army leadership to form a distinct military intelligence arm.
 - d. None of the above.
5. Who is credited with conceiving the code wheel that eventually became the U.S. Army’s M-94 cipher device in 1923? _____.
6. Who was the U.S. Army’s pre-World War I code expert? _____. He wrote the Army’s first publication on cryptology in 1915 entitled _____.
7. What was the key in solving the coded message from the Mexican government to the governor of Sonora sent in 1886? It contained the name “Geronimo”
8. Who is considered the giant of U.S. Army cryptology for breaking a Japanese code that led to an allied intelligence advantage in the war in the Pacific? _____. What was that Japanese code commonly called? _____.
9. In what year did the Berlin Wall come down, symbolizing the end of the Cold War? _____.
10. Who was the U.S. Army intelligence officer shot down while on an observation mission inside Soviet-manned East Germany? _____. To what unique unit was he assigned? _____.

11. When was the Army’s first surveillance drone, the SD-1, flown at Fort Huachuca? _____.
12. Why was the Army’s first use of tactical aerial reconnaissance thwarted during the 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico?
 - a. The planes were more urgently needed to fly combat missions.
 - b. The aircraft could not reach the altitudes necessary to clear the mountains of northern Mexico.
 - c. There were too few aviators.
 - d. The planes were needed to fly dispatches from headquarters to the roving columns of cavalry.
13. Overall, Operation DESERT STORM could be adjudged an overwhelming success for U.S. Army intelligence? **True** or **False**.
14. Who was the first U.S. Army warrant officer in space? _____. What was the mission of

- the Terra Scout mission? _____.
15. What was the primary use of the Welrod pistol? _____.
16. During World War II the Counter Intelligence Corps had as one of its missions the scouting out and capturing German work on the atomic bomb and rocketry. Who led what was known as the "ALSOS" mission? _____.
17. The U.S. Army's Corps of Intelligence Police was formed in _____ and renamed the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in _____.
18. General Orders No. 38 established the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Branch in _____.
19. Imagery analysts are trained in the techniques _____.
20. The Night Vision Pocket Scope was used by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in East Germany during the Cold War. It _____ to give the operator a clear scene.
21. The lens stereoscope provides _____ view of an image by placing it upon a pair of overlapping identical photographs.
22. A latex tree limb was attached to a tree in a forest next to an enemy airbase to _____.
23. Who was the first U.S. Army officer to be called the "G-2"? _____.
24. Oscar Koch was the World War II G2 for what commander? _____.
25. Where was the Japanese map of Pearl Harbor found? _____.
26. In both World War I and World War II, who was the trusted chief for General Douglas MacArthur? _____.
27. There considerable changes in technology and organization for military intelligence between World War II and the Korean War. True or **False**.
28. The only military intelligence officer to receive the nation's highest award was _____, an assistant intelligence officer with the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam.
29. The purpose of Air-Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detectors were to _____.
30. The Portable Ground Surveillance Radar, AN/PPS-5 can detect people moving up to _____ miles and can spot vehicles at over _____ miles.
31. First used in the Korean War, the _____ was the workhorse during the Vietnam War for determining from what direction enemy radio signals were coming.
32. The first American intelligence soldier to be killed in the Vietnam War was a member of the 3d Radio Research Unit who was killed in a December 1961 ambush. He was _____.

Answers to “History Hunt” Quiz

1. In what year did the Counter Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Md., become The Army Intelligence School? 1955. When did it move to Fort Huachuca? 1971.
2. Charles Young was a cavalryman, the first African-American field grade officer, and a key leader during the 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico. He is also distinguished by these facts:
 - a. He was an accomplished linguist, speaking Latin, Greek, French, Spanish and German.
 - b. He served as a professor of military science at Wilberforce University in Ohio.
 - c. He graduated from West Point in 1889.
 - d. *All of the above.***
3. Arthur L. Wagner wrote the first text in the U.S. Army on military intelligence. It was titled The Service of Security and Information.
4. Why is Col. Ralph H. Van Deman generally regarded as the “Father of Military Intelligence?”
 - a. He served in the Philippines in intelligence assignments.
 - b. He worked at the Military Intelligence Division for Col. Arthur Wagner.
 - c. *He urged the Army leadership to form a distinct military intelligence arm.***
 - d. None of the above.
5. Who is credited with conceiving the code wheel that eventually became the U.S. Army’s M-94 cipher device in 1923? Thomas Jefferson.
6. Who was the U.S. Army’s pre-World War I code expert? Col. Parker Hitt. He wrote the Army’s first publication on cryptology in 1915 entitled Manual for the Solution of Military Ciphers.
7. What was the key in solving the coded message from the Mexican government to the governor of Sonora sent in 1886? It contained the name “Geronimo”
8. Who is considered the giant of U.S. Army cryptology for breaking a Japanese code that led to an allied intelligence advantage in the war in the Pacific? William Friedman. What was that Japanese code commonly called? PURPLE.
9. In what year did the Berlin Wall come down, symbolizing the end of the Cold War? 1989.
10. Who was the U.S. Army intelligence officer shot down while on an observation mission inside Soviet-manned East Germany? Lt. Col. Arthur D. Nicholson. To what unique unit was he assigned? U.S. Army Military Liaison Mission to the commander of Soviet forces in East Germany, also known as USMLM.
11. When was the Army’s first surveillance drone, the SD-1, flown at Fort Huachuca? 1957 to 1961.
12. Why was the Army’s first use of tactical aerial reconnaissance thwarted during the 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico?
 - a. The planes were more urgently needed to fly combat missions.
 - b. *The aircraft could not reach the altitudes necessary to clear the mountains of northern Mexico.***
 - c. Their were too few aviators.
 - d. The planes were needed to fly dispatches from headquarters to the roving columns of cavalry.
13. Overall, Operation DESERT STORM could be adjudged an overwhelming success for U.S. Army intelligence? ***True*** or False.
14. Who was the first U.S. Army warrant officer in space? Thomas H. Hennen. What was the mission of

the Terra Scout mission? It was an earth observation experiment which combined the skills of an imagery analyst using an advanced optical sensor.

15. What was the primary use of the Welrod pistol? silent sentry removal.

16. During World War II the Counter Intelligence Corps had as one of its missions the scouting out and capturing German work on the atomic bomb and rocketry. Who led what was known as the "ALSOS" mission? Colonel Boris Pash.

17. The U.S. Army's Corps of Intelligence Police was formed in World War I and renamed the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in 1942.

18. General Orders No. 38 established the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Branch in 1962.

19. Imagery analysts are trained in the techniques of interpreting imagery collected by aerial sensors.

20. The Night Vision Pocket Scope was used by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in East Germany during the Cold War. It reflected starlight, skyglow or moonlight to give the operator a clear scene.

21. The lens stereoscope provides a three-dimensional view of an image by placing it upon a pair of overlapping identical photographs.

22. A latex tree limb was attached to a tree in a forest next to an enemy airbase to provide real-time video pictures.

23. Who was the first U.S. Army officer to be called the "G-2?" Dennis E. Nolan.

24. Oscar Koch was the World War II G2 for what commander? George Patton.

25. Where was the Japanese map of Pearl Harbor found? In a two-man scout submarine.

26. In both World War I and World War II, who was the trusted chief for General Douglas MacArthur? Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby.

27. There considerable changes in technology and organization for military intelligence between World War II and the Korean War. True or *False*.

28. The only military intelligence officer to receive the nation's highest award was First Lieutenant George K. Sisler, an assistant intelligence officer with the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam.

29. The purpose of Air-Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detectors were to detect enemy movements along remote trails.

30. The Portable Ground Surveillance Radar, AN/PPS-5 can detect people moving up to three miles and can spot vehicles at over six miles.

31. First used in the Korean War, the AN/PRD-1 Direction Finding Set was the workhorse during the Vietnam War for determining from what direction enemy radio signals were coming.

32. The first American intelligence soldier to be killed in the Vietnam War was a member of the 3d Radio Research Unit who was killed in a December 1961 ambush. He was Specialist Four James T. Davis.