Aside from being the U.S. Army's first counterintelligence unit, the Corps of Intelligence Police was unique for another reason. It was the first organization that was filled entirely by NCOs. New regulations for the outfit specified that its operatives all be in the rank of sergeant. This meant that service in the CIP for a group of highly intelligent linguists and inventive specialists was a dead end. There could be no promotions. Additionally, these unpromotable sergeants were required to live a monastic existence. The new regulations said, "The work devolving upon Intelligence Police will leave no time to take part in social life. Therefore private associates should not be cultivated. Your entire time will be occupied with your duties. Do not frequent military messes or canteens. Attend strictly to business."
Police was unique for another reason. It was the first British at the intelligence school at Le Havre. Aside from their ranks, ten CIP agents were picked to train with the French draft dodgers by their French police instructor and several members of the corps who were discovered to be construction and began their training under the tutelage of straightened out, they were installed in quarters still under suspicious character. With the matter of their identity arrival in the war zone by U.S. marines because of their "sharp Creoles." The first 50 sergeants shipped out for Paris confidence men mixed in with some Harvard grads and deserters, Communist agitators, mental defectives and officers reveals a questionable lot of ex-cons, French short of Van Deman's standards. The notes of recruiting placed in French-speaking quarters of New Orleans fell a little expectations and the men who responded to newspaper ads military bearing, able to speak French or German, with social Van Deman back in Washington to provide him with 50 noncom- American Expeditionary Force. He asked Col. Ralph Van Nolan, saw the need for a counterintelligence force within the American Expeditionary Force. He asked Col. Ralph Van Deman back in Washington to provide him with 50 noncommissioned officers familiar with European languages and methods of investigation. This was the birth of the Corps of Intelligence Police which would later evolve into the Counter Intelligence Corps.

Van Deman’s recruiting effort called for men of character, military bearing, able to speak French or German, with social sense and a diplomatic aptitude. Reality seldom matches ideal expectations and the men who responded to newspaper ads placed in French-speaking quarters of New Orleans fell a little short of Van Deman’s standards. The notes of recruiting officers reveals a questionable lot of ex-cons, French deserters, Communist agitators, mental defectives and confidence men mixed in with some Harvard grads and “sharp Creoles.” The first 50 sergeants shipped out for Paris in October 1917 and were immediately arrested upon their arrival in the war zone by U.S. marines because of their suspicious character. With the matter of their identity straightened out, they were installed in quarters still under construction and began their training under the tutelage of Commandant Walter of the French Surete. It was an educational experience for all concerned, especially for the several members of the corps who were discovered to be French draft dodgers by their French police instructor and thrown in jail. After that initial screening and thinning of their ranks, ten CIP agents were picked to train with the British at the intelligence school at Le Havre. Aside from being the U.S. Army’s first CI unit, the Corps of Intelligence Police was unique for another reason. It was the first organization on the Army’s rolls the ranks of which were filled entirely by NCOs. New regulations for the outfit specified that its operatives all be in the rank of “sergeant of infantry.” This meant that service in the CIP for a group of highly intelligent linguists and inventive specialists was a dead end. There could be no promotions. There were other hardships imposed by regulations. Nolan was given the authority to attach members of the intelligence police to field units and give them a monthly stipend for quarters of $15. They would also receive a $2 per diem rate for rations, since it was not practicable to assign them to any organization for subsistence. It would hamper their investigative operations. These unpromotable sergeants were required to live a monastic existence within the Army. While they were free of much military discipline, expected to use their own initiative, and often unsupervised, they were also counted upon to exercise self-discipline, refraining from profanity, controlling their emotions, staying away from the off-duty temptations of women and wine, and abstinence from tobacco. Principles of conduct for the CIP spelled out what was expected of them. “The work devolving upon Intelligence Police will leave no time to take part in social life. Therefore private associates should not be cultivated. Your entire time will be occupied with your duties. Do not frequent military messes or canteens. Attend strictly to business.” Most of these dedicated NCOs must have attended strictly to business, for the organization enjoyed much success and General Pershing asked that the number of agents be upped to 750. In Europe they had investigated 3,700 cases, convicted three agents of espionage, interned another 107, and expelled 119 from the war zone. They neutralized 229 suspected enemy agents. By the time of the Armistice, there 418 CIP agents in the AEF, and less than 250 working in the continental U.S. By 1920 the corps had only six men and a dog, all eligible for discharge. Importantly, the organization did not get dis-banded. The criticality of counterintelligence work was now officially recognized within the U.S. Army. The CIP survived to carry out interwar operations in Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines, and along the Mexican border. It was in place on the advent of World War II, and after being renamed the Counterintelligence Corps, it built an enviable record in fighting both in Europe and the Pacific.

Among this ascetic clan was a Portuguese-born American sergeant named Peter dePasqua. In the French city of Beaune, where the American Services of Supply maintained an important logistics depot and hospital, you would not have recognized him as an American sergeant. An accomplished linguist, he was ostensibly working as an interpreter for the American Red Cross. To a cell of anti-American Spanish laborers and German spies, he was a friend and in complete sympathy with their cause. DePasqua gained their trust by supplying a U.S. mail censor’s stamp that helped them send their messages supposedly unimpeded through the mails. He provided a skeleton key that would give the conspirators access to plans of the American facilities that were targeted for destruction. But before any of the plots could come to fruition, dePasqua alerted French security forces who rounded up the German spy ring. For his daring role in the undercover operation, dePasqua was recommended for a Distingui-
allowed for combat operations, was granted instead the Citation for Meritorious Service that had been newly created by General John J. Pershing. When the war ended, dePasqua stayed on in Paris, married, and became manager of a U.S. shipping firm. The girl he married did not know that her finance was an American sergeant until he showed up at the wedding in uniform. A barracks building at Fort Huachuca is named for him.

But the tradition of the MI noncommissioned officer actually began long before the Corps of Intelligence Police was formed in 1917. It can trace its origins to the American Revolution and the first days of the U.S. Army’s existence. Intelligence as reconnaissance began when the American Army was formed. In 1776, General George Washington, a man who had assiduously schooled himself in the art of war, saw the need for a special unit that could be his eyes and ears, ranging through British-held territory to gather information on the disposition of the king’s forces. It was for this reason that Knowlton’s Rangers was formed, the first unit to be solely organized for the purpose of collecting military intelligence. It was led by Lt. Col. Thomas Knowlton, an experienced soldier who had learned about reconnaissance operations during the French Indian Wars. He carefully chose from among the volunteers men suited for combat reconnaissance and special missions.

It was from the ranks of Knowlton’s Rangers that stepped men like Capt. Nathan Hale to undertake espionage mission involving great danger. Another of these was a 26-year-old NCO named Daniel Bissell, a sergeant in the 2d Connecticut Regiment of the Continental Line. The time was August 1781, a critical juncture in the American Revolution when George Washington desperately needed to keep the divided British forces in place, Clinton in New York and Cornwallis in Virginia, until he could concentrate his forces around Yorktown. The key to his strategy was the most elaborate deception and intelligence-gathering operation that the U.S. Army would employ over the next century and a half.

Sergeant Bissell was to play a major part. The plan was to have Bissell desert, infiltrate British lines and offer his sympathies and services to the British army. It was expected that, in this way, he could deliver misleading information about Washington’s intentions and collect intelligence on British preparations. But like so many plans, it fell apart early when Bissell learned that General Harry Clinton had ordered that protection would no longer be extended to American deserters. In fact, the whole mission was threatened by the press gangs that roamed the New York streets, impressing into the British Navy any able-bodied men. To avoid being swept up by these gangs, and badly needing medical attention for a fever, Bissell enrolled in a corps newly raised by Gen. Benedict Arnold. His sickness worsened in a British military hospital where he languished for almost ten months. The sergeant learned from his attending physician that he had been talking during his periods of delirium. Fearing that he had revealed his secret mission, he determined to escape, taking with him a companion. The escape was a harrowing one during which they were pursued by a detachment of British light horse, commandeered a farmer’s boat to take them across a river, and threw off the bloodhounds by submerging themselves in a swamp for several hours. They finally reached Washington’s camp on 29 September 1782.

Sergeant Bissell was one of three soldiers to receive the Badge of Military Merit, or the Purple Heart as it became known, the U.S. Army’s first military medal for conspicuous gallantry and one that has been called the early equivalent of the Medal of Honor. His achievements in the War of Independence were not to be the end of Bissell’s contributions to his country. In the years following the war, he campaigned against Indians along the Ohio River, fought against the French in 1799 as a first lieutenant, and commanded Fort Massac on the Ohio River in 1804. He would also command part of the province of Louisiana after its purchase from the French, and lead American troops in the battle of Lyon’s Creek during the War of 1812. Having reached the rank of general in 1814, he commanded posts at Mobile, New Orleans and Baton Rouge before his retirement in 1821.

From the American Revolution to the 20th century, MI was a formless discipline within the U.S. Army and was generally thought of as something analogous to reconnaissance. During the 1700s and 1800s in the American Army, the roles of the NCO were the traditional ones of small unit leader, trainer, and keeper of the standards. The MI noncom can claim as his forebears the dragoon and cavalry sergeants who led daring raids and reconnaissances in the quest for information about the enemy. As the leader of small recon forces, they were undertaking one of the most risky jobs in warfare and were providing the basis for the motto of the MI Corps adopted in 1987, “Always Out Front.”

Thomas O. Harter was a sergeant in the First Indiana Cavalry in August 1862 when the general commanding the XIth Corps, Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, pulled him out of his regiment for a special mission involving not only great risk, but unusual latitude of judgment. Harter was entering the realm of human intelligence. Despite recent innovations in signals intercept and balloon reconnaissance, HUMINT was still the most relied upon tool by far of the Civil War commander. Unlike his predecessors in America’s earlier wars, like Capt. Nathan Hale and Sgt. Daniel Bissell, Harter would have going for him an intangible element of intelligence work— incredible luck.

In this case, the commander, General Sigel, was responding to a demand of his boss and the man placed in charge of the newly formed Army of Virginia, Maj. Gen. John Pope, who was urging his corps commanders to produce better intelligence. One of his first acts of command in July was to telegraph his subordinates. To one he said, “Spare no means through spies and others to inform yourself of the movements of the enemy’s cavalry in the
valley,”. To another he wired, “I hope you will use every means and spare no money to get information.” To General Sigel, he ordered, “Send out some scouts and spies to ascertain if there is a considerable force of the enemy in the neighborhood of Staunton or east of Staunton.” So it fell to Sgt. Harter, a 28-year-old veteran of just over one year and a railroad engineer in civilian life, to bring back information on the enemy.

He set out on 12 August for Staunton, his target area, with a new suit of civilian clothes and several hundred dollars in gold. His cover was that of a refugee railroad man seeking work. His mission was to get a fix on Lee’s Army and return within three weeks. Before he could get anywhere near the enemy he was arrested, deprived of his money and pistol, and eventually sent to Richmond. But his luck improved along the way. One of the stops during his detainment was at Staunton where somehow he obtained an interview with the superintendent of the local rail line who was familiar with Harter’s old employer at Terre Haute. This led to a letter of introduction to the superintendent at Richmond who was desperately looking for qualified engineers. He was released by the Confederate provost and put to work on the very line that was supplying Lee’s advance in Virginia. Arriving back at Gordonsville, he fell in with Lee’s Army which was on the march to the Rapidan, bringing into play his powers of observation. On the morning of Lee’s attack, the 18th, he left the Confederate camp, swam the Rapidan River, and immediately found a Union divisional headquarters, at which, by another stroke of good fortune, General Pope was present. One of the usual deficiencies of scouting work was the agent’s difficulties in returning to friendly lines through enemy pickets and cavalry patrols, finding the headquarters of the commander, usually to the rear, and unburdening himself of his information before the enemy could strike, rendering his intelligence worthless.

But Harter found himself dripping wet before the commanders and staff of the Army of Virginia. He lost no time in reporting that, “the larger part of [Lee’s Army] was but a short distance from the river in our front, behind a mountain ridge running parallel with the river, that this army was on the point of marching, had their teams all ready to hitch up, and were evidently to move at an early moment to turn our left.” Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, who was present at this debriefing, later wrote that this intelligence “induced Major General Pope to order his own army to retreat immediately behind the Rappahannock.” In Pope’s official report on the campaign, he credits the famous captured letter with saving his Army from envelopment. But according to Edwin Fishel, the foremost historian of military intelligence in the Civil War, this was perhaps “the clearest example” of a general using a cover story to protect his intelligence source. After the war, Pope wrote a personal letter to Harter telling him that “you were the first person to give the information” of the impending Confederate attack.

This episode inspired an Army staffer to propose to the Secretary of War that these kinds of dangerous espionage missions should be rewarded. “Such extra-hazardous service cannot be measured by a money valuation, but [Sgt. Harter] should be compensated liberally, as a Government expression that such services are appreciated.” The sergeant would receive a $500 award.

Since the mission comprised Harter (the military police who had detained him wrote a description of him), further service that might lead to his capture was out of the question. He was discharged. Disregarding his personal safety, he went to work as a detective for the Union Provost Marshal in the Baltimore district. In that capacity, he scouted the Confederates’ retreat from Gettysburg in July 1863. In November 1864 he got work with the Bureau of Information of the Army of the Potomac, headed by Col. Sharpe, but they let him go when they learned that he was known to the Confederate Army after his August 1862 escapade. Historian Fishel writes that Harter’s report to Pope “may well be the timeliest single product of espionage received by any Union commander during the entire war.”
When Maj. Gen. Joe Hooker assumed duties as the commander of the Army of the Potomac in February 1863, he ordered his provost marshal to "organize and perfect a system for collecting information as speedily as possible." Col. George H. Sharpe was put in charge and he immediately began assembling his team. Unlike Col. Lafayette Baker who ran his secret service in Washington, D.C., using disconted civilians, reformed Confederate deserters and other untrustworthy opportunists, Sharpe was determined to fill his bureau of information with only soldiers or highly qualified civilian professionals.

He started with a core of NCO scouts. These men were Sgt. Milton W. Cline and Sgt. Daniel Cole, both of the Third Indiana Cavalry, an outfit known as "Hooker's Horse Marines." There was Sgt. Mordecai P. Hunnicutt, an Ohio infantry man. From this beginning the bureau would swell to 21 by mid-April. It was the policy in the U.S. Army at the time that officers could direct espionage operations, but could not engage in them. There were exceptions, but for the most part the deceptive work was left to the enlisted ranks. Fishel remarked, "Presumably it was thought that spying was a business suited to the lower ranks on the social scale. Fortunately for the army, its "lower ranks" were not wanting for men of wit and nerve."

Cline, at 38, was the "old man" of the group. Like Sharpe, he hailed from upstate New York, the Lake Camplain area. He had formerly been a sailor, leaving behind the rolling deck for the choppier gait of a cavalry mount. The red-headed Cline was launched by Sharpe on his first intelligence mission in late February.

His was the most daring of these behind the lines penetrations. Wearing a Confederate uniform, he would enter the enemy camps and get a first-hand feel for their strengths, dispositions and intentions. He literally traversed the length of Lee’s lines from right to left. He was able, upon his return, to give a complete picture of the enemy forces, with the exception of two brigades at the extreme left. Taken with the information picked up from prisoners and deserters, his boss, Colonel Sharpe, could piece together an order of battle that was very accurate for the time.

His observations sometimes appeared to be as imprecise as his spelling. About the enemy around Chancellorsville he reported that there "seamed to be a considerabell force." Perhaps as valuable as order-of-battle information was intelligence Cline picked up on the conditions in the Confederate camps. Knowledge that the food ration was running out and that boots were in a tattered condition could give Sharpe an indication of the states of supply and morale among the forces opposing them.

By the time he returned to headquarters ten days after setting out, the sergeant had traveled 250 miles, the last 10 on a stolen horse; shared a bottle of whiskey with his Confederate hosts; been shot at by either friendly or enemy forces; and accomplished the deepest and longest infiltration of the Confederation Army recorded during the war.

On another occasion on 17 June, Cline led a patrol of men into the midst of the enemy army by dressing in Confederate or partisan uniforms and, during the fighting along the front, merging into the Confederate formations. It was a few days later that John C. Babcock, Sharpe’s civilian order-of-battle expert, requested Cline for a special mission. In his letter to the head of the Bureau of Information, he wrote, "If my mission here is of any impor-tance, for Gods sake send me one man who wont run when there is nobody after him and is not frightened when he sees a greyback." In February 1864, Capt. John McEntee led a detachment of bureau scouts on a raid accompanying Col. Ulric Dahlgren who was attempting to free prisoners in the Richmond prisons. The force was ambushed and the men either killed or taken prisoner. All but one of McEntee’s men were taken captive, a disaster that McEntee blamed on the Sgt. Cline’s disregard of unspecified orders. Cline was mustered out, along with his regiment, the Third Indiana Cavalry, in August 1864. He was replaced by Sgt. Judson Knight.

Other of Sharpe’s scouts decamped on intelligence-gathering missions behind enemy lines. One of these was another Indiana caval-
ryman and former blacksmith named Daniel Cole. The sergeant was 28 years old and a veteran of one year and nine months. He had experience ranging into enemy territory, having scouted for General Hooker when he was with the Third Indiana.

His mission came to an end before it started. As was often the technique to get into Confederate camps, Cole gave himself up to the pickets of the 9th Virginia Cavalry, perhaps passing himself off as a deserter who wished to join the Confederate ranks. He was not welcomed as some of his predecessors had been. Instead he was shipped to the rear and he spent the ensuing months in Libby Prison in Richmond. He was eventually released for lack of evidence that he was a spy.

Sgt. Mordecai P. Hunnicutt was another scout for Sharpe’s bureau. He, like the other NCOs in the outfit, had some special qualification for the work. Hunnicutt in civilian life had been a detective for a time in Memphis, and he knew his way around the Richmond area, having grown up in Prince George County south of the city. He had been around and seen some action before the war. He moved to Ohio and when he was 21 he enlisted in an Ohio regiment bound for the Mexican War. Ten years later found him with William Walker’s filibustering expedition into Mexico. There he was captured, along with his comrades, and wound up as a pastry cook in the Costa Rican presidential palace. He was involved in the fighting in Kansas just before the Civil War broke out. The blue-eyed, bald Hunnicutt joined the 73d Ohio Infantry in November 1862. His experiences made him a good choice for NCO stripes. He volunteered for Sharpe’s scouts to relieve the monotony of soldiering. In June 1863 he was posing as a deserter from the Federal Army and picking up information around his boyhood haunts in the Richmond area. He cataloged the enemy units in detail and reported that the Richmond area was devoid of any troops that might reinforce Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, important information that served General Hooker well.

The Apaches of the American Southwest were probably the most elusive and cunning adversary the U.S. Army faced in the first few hundred years of its existence. To meet this challenge of military intelligence, a new tactical tool was needed and the man who honed that tool to fine sharpness was an experienced Indian fighter, Brevet Major General George Crook. The low intensity conflict of the Indian Wars once again drew forth the resourcefulness that would become the hallmark of the American Army leader. The use of Indian Scouts by U.S. Army commanders on the frontier was one way military intelligence was employed with ingenuity and effectiveness. A prominent example was the Apache campaign in Arizona and New Mexico between 1862 and 1886. Their use in Arizona, as both spies on the reservation and as reconnaissance patrols in the field, was given credit for bringing the renegade Apaches to bay and significantly shortening the Apache campaigns.

The American Army had used Indians as guides ever since its inception, but they were employed as civilians. It was not until an Act of Congress in July 1866 that Indians were actually enlisted and became an official unit of the U.S. Army. General George Crook made extensive use of Apache scouts in Arizona territory to track down Apache renegades. Crook would emphasize their worth in his official report: “I cannot too strongly assert that there has never been any success in operations against these Indians, unless Indian scouts were used. These Chiricahua scouts...were of more value in hunting down and compelling the surrender of the renegades than all other troops...combined. The use of Indian scouts was dictated by the soundest of military policy.”

Probably the most famous of Apache Scouts, Alchesay, or “The Little One,” was born between Globe and Showlow, Arizona, around 1853. He enlisted in 1872 and became First Sergeant of A Company, Indian Scouts, commanded by Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood, 6th U.S. Cavalry. He participated in major campaigns in the Tonto Basin area in 1872 and 1873. Captain John Bourke, Crook’s aide and biographer, described him as “a perfect Adonis in figure, a mass of muscle and sinew of wonderful courage, great sagacity, and as faithful as an Irish hound.” Following the Tonto Basin campaign during the winter of 1872 and ending 9 April 1873, Brevet Maj. Gen. George Crook recommended Alchesay and nine other Apache Scouts for award of the Medal of Honor, which were granted a few years later. “For conspicuous gallantry in a charge upon the Tonto Apaches in Sycamore Canyon, A.T., when the valuable [horse] herd belonging to Bashford and Stevens were recaptured,” said General Crook in recommending the following scouts: Sergeant Alchesay, Private Machol, Private Blanquet, and Private Chiquito of the Sierra Blanca [White Mountain] Apaches; and Sergeant Jim, Private Kelsay, Private Kasoha, Private Nantaje, Private Nannasaddi, and Corporal Elsatsosoo, all of the Aravaipa Apaches. General Crook gave a large share of the credit for his success in these fights to Apache scouts.

Alchesay, who was considered the chief of the White Mountain clan, was also involved in the 1886 Geronimo campaign. He visited President Grover Cleveland in Washington and acted as a counselor to Indian Agents in Arizona Territory. Alchesay died in 1928, a chief to his own people and a friend to the U.S. Army which depended so much on his abilities. A barracks at Fort Huachuca is named...
for him.

During the Indians Wars in the American West, the small U.S. Army, faced with garrisoning a vast expanse, relied on cavalry patrols to locate hostile Indian bands. These were often led by experienced NCOs like Sergeant John Mott. He was a sergeant in Company F, 3d U.S. Cavalry, and distinguished himself in the action at Bear Springs, Whetstone Mountains, Arizona Territory, on 5 May 1871. On 27 April 1871, Lt. Howard Cushing, Sgt. John Mott, a civilian packer and 16 privates left Camp Crittenden on a scout that would circle the Huachuca Mountains, hard on the Arizona-Mexico border. Nine days and 230 miles out found them going north along the east side of the Huachuca mountains and heading for a campsite at Bear Springs in the southern end of the Whetstone mountains. There they struck a trail, a lone woman and a pony headed for the spring. Mott took three men to investigate the tracks. Catching up to the Apache woman, he observed that she was taking “great pains to make a clear print of her foot at every step, and that she even avoided all stones and rocks in order to do this more effectually.” Mott immediately sensed a trap, and seeing a large party of Apaches moving to his rear, decided he must try to rejoin Cushing and the main detachment. But suddenly the Indians were among them, even close enough to snatch a hat off the head of one private. Mott concluded that they intended to take them alive as they were surely close enough to shoot the four cavalrymen. Lieutenant Cushing came up with the rest of the force just in time and a firefight ensued. The soldiers lost three horses; the Apache left five dead and made for safer ground further up the canyon. Cushing was determined to follow with his seven men, others having been sent back with the wounded or left behind to guard the pack train. Outnumbered 15 to 1, Mott counseled the lieutenant against pursuit but was overruled. They had advanced about 20 yards when Cushing was hit in the chest. Mott, along with Private Fichter, picked up their officer and began carrying him to the rear, when he was shot again, this time fatally in the head. Under Mott’s leadership, the small party stopped to pour fire into the advancing Indians who were within 30 yards. It was at this time that the packer, Mr. Simpson, was killed. When they tried to mount, Mott and Fichter had their horses shot out from under them and the heavy fire killed Private Green. He ordered the bulk of his force, now totaling 14 effective men, to ride out with the pack train while he and a few others provided covering fire for their withdrawal. Mott and his rearguard fought a running battle with the Apaches all the way back to Camp Crittenden. In his after-action report, he listed the three men killed and one wounded, and said he believed they had killed 13 of the enemy, thought to be led by Juh, a Chiricahua war chief.

Had it not been for the cool appraisal of the desperate situation by Sergeant Mott and his subsequent action, it is likely that the entire command might have been annihilated. According to a contemporary, Captain John G. Bourke of the 3d Cavalry, “had it not been for the courage and good judgment displayed by Sergeant John Mott, who had seen a great amount of service against the Apaches, not one of the command would have escaped alive out of the canyon.” For his part in the Bear Springs action, Mott was awarded the Medal of Honor. A street at Fort Huachuca is named for him.

It was during the hard campaigning of the Indian Wars that another unique military intelligence unit emerged to take its place alongside Knowlton’s Rangers, the Mexican Spy Company, and Maj. Gen. Grenville Dodge’s Corps of Scouts. It went by the racially descriptive name of the Seminole Negro-Indian Scouts, although it was usually just referred to as the Seminole Scouts. The men, never exceeding 50 in strength, were descendants of those slaves who had fled to Florida and lived among the Seminole nation. Resettled in Indian Territory and faced with domination by other tribes, they again ran off, this time to Mexico where they settled along the border. An officer of the 25th Infantry serving in Texas, recruited one band in 1870 to serve as scouts for his regiment. They were enlisted for six months at a time. Other bands followed to enlist as scouts. They usually served with the African-American regiments, the 24th and 25th Infantry, and the 9th and 10th Cavalry, but often times operated independently. From 1873 to 1881 they participated in 26 major expeditions under Lieutenant John Bullis, a civil war vet who came to establish a close personal relationship with his men and their families. They scouted around the Texas panhandle for Cheyenne, Commanche and Kiowas.

It was on one such occasion in April 1875 that three Seminole Scouts and Lieut. Bullis struck the trail of some Commanche horse thieves and followed the track to the Eagle’s Nest Crossing of the Pecos River. There they were surrounded by about 30 Comanches and after holding them off for some time, made a dash for it. The men, Sgt. John Ward, Trumpeter Isaac Payne, and Trooper Pompey Factor, were riding clear of the attacking Indians when they noticed Bullis was not with them. He had trouble with his horse which had bolted, and was now about to be overrun by the Comanches.

Sgt. Ward swung his horse around and yelled, “We can’t leave the lieutenant, boys!” His two fellow scouts were right behind him. The Indians opened up, shooting off Ward’s carbine sling. He seemed to be the focus of the enemy fire. Ward pulled Bullis up behind him and raced away, a bullet smashing the stock of his carbine. Factor and Payne were firing in every direction, holding off the Indians swirling around them. Then all four men made good their escape. Bullis later wrote that Ward and his comrades “saved my hair.” The three enlisted men all were awarded the Medal of Honor. The faithful service of the Seminole Scouts was rewarded by denying them the land grants they had hoped for, disbanding the organization, and kicking them off the Fort Clark reservation.

Twentieth century warfare brought some changes for the NCO. Not only were his chevrons rotated 180 degrees so that the points were up beginning in 1904, but the complexities of post-industrial warfare called for specialists to manipulate the host of new technologies on the battlefield. He was still a small unit leader, a trainer, and a guardian of the standards, but if he were an intelligence-related NCO, he would probably be leading a small unit of technicians, training them in specialties like acoustic range-finding, code-breaking, investigation, and radio intercept. While he was also expected
to be proficient as a combat soldier, he would find himself taking on more and more complex jobs as the century progressed.

The few hundred NCOs that served in World War I’s Corps of Intelligence Police, all possessing abilities uncommon in the military ranks, and all expected to show an unusual degree of ingenuity and freedom of action, not only contributed to the emergence of MI within the U.S. Army as an indispensable discipline, but established a tradition for the intelligence NCO that would persist throughout the century. It was a tradition which said, all will depend on us to bring to intelligence NCOs that would persist throughout the century.

Uncommon in the military ranks, and all expected to show an imaginative solution. He correctly reasoned that no one could know more about the condition of the river bottom than sports fishermen who waded the river repeatedly looking for American boots. He found a fishing club in Luxembourg and interrogated anglers for two days. After cross-checking their reports, a clear picture emerged of every square foot of river for a stretch of 25 miles. Troops ford the river at the location recommended by the G2 team, lives were saved, and the CIC troops received a commendation. Richard M. Sakakida enlisted with his buddy Arthur S. Komori in the CIP at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, in March 1941. Sakakida had a feel for the military profession, having been designated cadet colonel in his high school equivalent of Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps. Both young men were made sergents and soon discovered that they were to undertake a highly secret mission in the Philippines. Traveling to Manila under the cover as civilian seamen, they were met and briefed by the commanding officer of the local CIP detachment and given their sealed orders. They were to pose as seamen who had jumped ship to avoid the draft and report on Japanese nationals in the city who may have contacts with Japanese military intelligence. The two agents blended in well with the Japanese community and collected valuable information. After Pearl Harbor, both men were picked up and detained as enemy citizens and interned in Bilidid prison, until they were freed by their contact in the CIP, Agent Grenfell Drisko. Along with other U.S. soldiers, they were evacuated to the fortress on Corregidor off the Bataan peninsula where they interrogated prisoners and translated documents. When it became apparent that Corregidor would be taken by the invading Japanese forces, they were scheduled to be evacuated to Australia with the rest of the G2 staff from General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters. Komori made the trip. Sakakida stayed behind, having given up his seat to a Hawaii-born Japanese lawyer who had been one of his sources and who would be in peril if captured by the Japanese.

When U.S. forces on Corregidor surrendered, Sakakida, now in uniform, was to act as translator for General Wainwright. Instead, he was thrown back into Bilidid prison and interrogated by the Japanese military police. He was burned with cigarettes and, with his hands tied behind his back, he was suspended until his shoulders were dislocated. He stuck to his story. He was a draft dodger who had been forced to work for the Americans as an interpreter. They were anxious moments for Sakakida who knew that he could be shot for treason, if his dual Japanese citizenship were turned up. Fortunately, his mother had voided his Japanese citizenship at the consulate in Hawaii just after he was shipped to the Philippines. He was released conditionally in February 1943 and, remarkably, made a houseboy in the home of Colonel Nishiharu, Chief Judge Advocate of the Japanese Fourteenth Army, until he was caught taking a couple of cartons of cigarettes from the colonel’s cache of captured American booty.

Still doing odd jobs in the Judge Advocate’s office, he came into contact with imprisoned Filipino guerrillas through the wife of one former comrade. He was able to furnish some of the wives with forged visitor’s passes. He soon formed a plan to break these men out of prison. Through the visiting wives, he managed to arrange for one of the guerrillas to get a job with the electrical shop and access to the prison’s electrical switches. Sneaking out of his barracks, he and four guerrillas, dressed as Japanese soldiers approached and overpowered the guards, turned out the lights, and freed nearly 500 prisoners, most of whom fled into the surrounding hills. He remained in contact with the guerrillas, funneling any information on troop movements that he could come by through them to General MacArthur’s headquarters in Australia. It was a daring enterprise which may have led to the intercept by allied submarines of Japanese troop transports reinforcing the island of Mindanao.

When the allies landed back in the Philippines in December 1944 and the Japanese situation became more desperate, Sakakida knew that he must make a run for it if he
were to avoid the increasing wrath of his captors. He was able to join up with a small guerrilla force, but he was wounded during a Japanese attack and separated from the band. For two months he hid in the jungle, debilitated by beri-beri, malaria, and dysentery. It had been four years since he had seen an American uniform, so, when an American patrol with its new issue of helmet and combat gear came near, he thought they might be German soldiers. Hearing them speak English, he stepped forward with the improbable story that he was an American sergeant who had escaped from the Japanese. His story checked out. Two CIC officers picked him up in a jeep.

After a short period of convalescence, he was back at work for what was now the Counter Intelligence Corps, interrogating prisoners and tracking down suspected war criminals. He was awarded the Bronze Star for his courageous service and would later be commissioned in the U.S. Air Force’s Office of Special Investigation, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel.

His friend Sgt. Arthur Komori had spent most of the war in Australia with the Allied Interpretation and Translation Service (ATIS) and he too received a Bronze Star for his intelligence work. Komori rejoined the CIC and was one of the first undercover agents to work in occupied Japan. He reached the rank of warrant officer and retired to practice law in Honolulu.

Michael Maslak began his career as a signal intelligence soldier at the outbreak of World War II. He joined the Army in April 1939 and was trained at Fort Monmouth in fixed-station operations. When the war with Japan began in 1941, he was on duty in the Philippines with the Second Signal Service Company and marching on foot through enemy-held territory toward the Bataan peninsula and eventually Corregidor where the American forces would make their last stand.

On “The Rock” he resumed his radio intercept efforts, working for Lt. Col. Joe Sherr, the commander of Detachment 6. His signal intelligence training made him and his fellows valuable enough to be moved out to Australia. The first leg of that journey took him first to Cebu, then to Mindanao, the southernmost island in the Philippine chain. By May, Corregidor had fallen and the Japanese had pushed as far south as Mindanao. The scramble for evacuation aircraft was on. There would be no plane for the six enlisted men of Detachment 6.

They decided to take to the hills rather than giving themselves up and becoming prisoners of war. They were issued pistols and packed six cans of sardines and ten pounds of rice. They gave most of their quinine tablets to the sick child of a Filipino sergeant. The make-up of the small group kept changing, as men fell out or became separated, and others met on the trail joined them. With the cash they had with them, they bought a small banca, a 30-foot dugout canoe used to transport rice along the coast. On the afternoon of 10 June 1942 they set sail for Darwin, Australia, some 1,700 miles away. The unlikely crew consisted of Maslak, Cpl. Irving A. Stein, Pfc. Stanley W. Kapp, all of Detachment 6, Capt. George Lindahl, a field artillery officer, Sgt. J. D. Biss of the U.S. Air Corps, and “Trench,” “Sperry” and “Max,” the nicknames given to three Filipinos who said they wanted to fight against the Japanese with the American forces.

They endured storms, swamping, cramped quarters, ripped sails, a waterlogged compass, and exposure during their 28 days at sea. Twice they encountered Japanese ships. On these occasions the Americans would hug the bottom of the dugout, leaving only the Filipinos in sight. Navigating mostly by the stars, they spotted land on the morning of 8 July. It was not Australia, but New Guinea. They landed on a small unnamed island between Waigeo and Halmahera, where they were put up for five weeks to repair their boat by the Chinese owner of the island. But on 24 September 1942 they were taken prisoner by the Japanese and spent the rest of the war in a prison camp in the Netherlands, East Indies. There Cpl. Stein and Pfc. Kapp died in 1944 from exposure, disease and starvation. Lindahl, Biss and Maslak survived and were liberated in September of that year. The fate of their Filipino fellow travelers is not known. Four months later Maslak was reassigned to Arlington Hall Station to resume his SIGINT duties with the Second Signal Service Battalion as a staff sergeant.

Special Agent Gerald R. Beatson was a bank clerk from Rockford, Illinois, who found himself in 1943 an agent in the Counter Intelligence Corps stationed in Naples. His friend and fellow special agent, Carl Fiebig, introduced him to a lieutenant colonel who was in Italy recruiting men for a top secret mission. Beatson was eager to get in on the action. He convinced the colonel, Boris Pash, that his lack of linguistic and technical training were more than compensated for by his combat experience, and that was something this team would need for they would be constantly at the forward edge of battle. “A fighting fool of a CIC agent,” was how Fiebig characterized him.

The mission was codenamed ALSOS, the Greek work for “grove,” the name of Lt. Gen. Leslie Groves who headed the Atomic Energy Commission back in Washington. Their job would be to sweep into territory newly taken by the allies and round up any scientists or information about scientific projects that would further the allied war effort. They would be especially interested in German capabilities to produce an atomic weapon.

When Beatson signed up for this mission, he had little idea that he would become his boss’ right-hand man, accompanying him on virtually every dangerous operation from Naples to Berlin. Col. Pash called him his “trigger man.” But Beatson was more than that. In an outfit that was so secret it operated independently in combat sectors, and had no established channels for supply or support, the ability to improvise would be highly prized. Beatson acted as a combat leader, investigator, detachment scrounger, driver, and any other job that needed doing for an outfit that was making up their operating procedures as they went along. The former bank clerk gave the detachment its name of Lightning A, and accompanied Colonel Pash on almost all of the daring missions. Beatson successfully directed the removal of large quantities of uranium ore on the Albert Canal while under fire. He may be best remembered for leading a detachment of eight men in four vehicles into the path of the Soviet advance to stall them until Pash and the rest of the Lightning A team could recover the radium standards developed by Madame Curie in Weida, Germany.
CSM Clovis D. Ice received his indoctrination to military life in the rice paddies and mountains of Korea as an infantry and armor soldier during the Korean War. In 1959 he began work as a traffic analyst with the 13th Radio Research Unit, 313th Army Security Agency Battalion, at Fort Bragg. After training at Fort Devens, he returned to Bragg and the 403d Army Security Agency Special Operations Detachment. He would serve with this unit and the 400th SOD in Vietnam for two tours, in Okinawa, and on three different occasions at Fort Bragg. It was in the field of intelligence airborne intercept operations that Ice made his mark. He personally developed and tested equipment that would evolve into the manpack intercept equipment that was to be used in airborne operations. CSM Ice was inducted into the MI Hall of Fame in 1988, named a Distinguished Member of the Corps in 1990, and died in October 1991.

Ever since his 1958 service with the 320th Army Security Agency Battalion in Bad Aibling, Germany, Master Sergeant Travis C. Bunn was a SIGINT soldier. In 1981 he combined those skills with special operations and became an instructor of Special Forces teams in security and counterintelligence for special ops. He taught at Fort Bragg and then at the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama. In the jungles of Panama he sought to convince the 8th Special Forces operating there that their habit of broadcasting from their base camps was a dangerous practice. They proved hard to convince because the jungle’s density provided them a natural ring of defense and they believed that none of the heavy direction-finding equipment could be used against them because it could not be easily packed into the fastness of the Panamanian interior. Bunn proved them wrong. He improvised his own “man-packable” direction-finding gear, using a PRC-6 Homing Device Antenna, a variable tuning coil attached to a AN/GRC-109 receiver, a broomstick with a nail driven in the bottom, and various other odds-and-ends. Armed with this gear, Bunn and his team located and surprised a Special Forces base camp, zeroing in on their transmissions. It was a lesson that resulted in the revision of special operations communications security policy and saved uncounted lives. Bunn continued his dual role as a signal security specialist and Special Forces team leader in the Republic of Vietnam in 1967 with the 403d Special Operations Detachment, 5th Special Forces Group. He trained and led a team of hill tribesmen in combat in the central highlands, and then controlled a team of radio intercept operators. His gallantry in these operations earned for him two Silver Stars. In 1969 he returned to Germany and an ASA field station at Herzogenaurach. In 1974 he became the Sergeant Major of the 402d Special Operations Detachment, 10th Special Forces Group, and ended his career as the Sergeant Major of Army Security Agency Southern Command and as the National Cryptologic Representative South, retiring in 1977. Just a few of those ingenious NCOs are brought forcibly to our attention by virtue of their prominent places in the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame. Others command our interest because of the large silhouette they have left on history’s horizon. Many, in recent years have achieved their pedestal in history by virtue of their intelligence and leadership abilities, qualities which propelled them to the Army’s highest enlisted ranks and positions of leadership. They were men like Command Sergeant Major George W. Howell, Jr., who, after holding a succession of responsible G2 jobs, retired in 1985 as the command sergeant major of the Army Intelligence and Security Command. Likewise, CSM James “Art” Johnson finished his distinguished career as the Intelligence and Security Command CSM, after serving at Fort Huachuca as the top NCO at the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca until 1993. CSM Clifford L. Charron, a combat veteran of World War II was instrumental in founding the Army Security Agency Benefit Association which provides funds to the families of ASA members killed in the line of duty and pressed for the permanent memorial at the headquarters of the Intelligence and Security Command which honors the Army Security Agency NCOs who were killed in action. Lou Rothenstein’s service dated from 1956 and included assignments in France, Turkey, and Lebanon during the 1958 crisis in the Middle East. He began his intelligence work in Korea with the Korean Military Advisory Group, then as an intelligence analyst with the G2 section of the Berlin Brigade. He served as an advisor in Vietnam before returning to Germany and the 66th MI Group. In July 1969 he took part in dangerous recon missions along the Cambodian border. He held several CSM jobs until becoming the command sergeant major for the USA Communications and Electronics Command. In July 1990 he was named the first Honorary Sergeant Major of the Military Intelligence Corps. CSM David P. Klehn had a long association with intelligence, most notably debriefing the first hostages released from the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, Iran, to gain information that would assist in the planning for a rescue operation. He was the command sergeant major of the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca from 1989 to 1991, and the second sergeant major of the MI Corps. Raymond McKnight, a former Morse operator during the Vietnam War, ended his career as the command sergeant major for the Intelligence and Security Command, serving three different commanders from July 1987 to June 1993. John O’Connor, decorated for heroism as a rifle platoon leader in Vietnam in 1968, made his greatest contributions as an educator and reformer in the field of enlisted training. As a command sergeant major, he was the commandant of the NCO Academy at the Intelligence Center until December 1992, and finished out his award-studded career as the CSM for the U.S. Army Garrison at Fort Huachuca.

The MI Corps also has its share of outright heroes, men who have made the ultimate sacrifice for their country and the traditions upon which the U.S. Army is founded. During World War II a significant number of Japanese-American intelligence NCOs stand out for their dedication and bravery. Most were linguists or interrogators assigned to the renowned Allied Translation and Interpretation Service that worked for General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters in the Southwest Pacific theater. They were NCOs like Corporal Yukitaka “Terry” Mizutari who was the first Nisei linguist killed in action when he was shot by a sniper at Aitape, New Guinea. Mizutari Hall at the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, was named in his honor. Technical Sergeant Frank Hachiya was one of the many Nisei interpreters who proved their worth in combat as well as performing as intelligence specialists. He was one of a three-man patrol that was in hot pursuit of three Japanese
soldiers when they suddenly found themselves confronted by a large force of the enemy. He was fatally hit and went down. His Silver Star citation says, “After being hit and while lying helpless on the ground, he fired a complete magazine from his pistol at the enemy, driving them up the ravine. Hachiya’s actions were an inspiration to the entire command.” Hachiya was credited with providing vital information that helped to save American lives before his death. A building at the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, was named in his honor. On 29 June 1945, Sgt. George Nakamura was trying to convince a group of enemy soldiers to surrender when he was shot and killed near Payawan, Luzon, in the Philippines. He was awarded the Silver Star for his courage. SSgt. Kazuo Kozaki was assigned to the Allied Translation and Interpreter Service in the Southwest Pacific Theater, where he fought with the Australian 9th Division at Lae, and earned the Purple Heart and Silver Star in October 1943. SSgt. Bob Kubo, another linguist during World War II in the Pacific, earned the Distinguished Service Cross on Saipan by crawling unarmed into a cave and convincing desperate Japanese soldiers to free more than 100 civilian hostages. Master Sergeant Lorenzo Alvarado began his intelligence career in World War I, acting as a Counter Intelligence Police agent in his native Philippines to guard against German espionage and sabotage activities. When World War II began, he stayed behind, at great risk to his personal safety, to gather intelligence for the U.S. Army. Alvarado Hall at Fort Huachuca is named for him. But all Counter Intelligence Corps agents in the Philippines were not as lucky as Alvarado. Many other NCO/agents lost their lives or disappeared into the jungles never to be seen again.7

In subsequent American wars, the intelligence NCO could be found at the heart of danger, undertaking to provide his commander with useful, life-saving information. There is Master Sergeant John R. Wilson, a counterintelligence NCO assigned to the famous 27th “Wolhoun” Infantry Regiment during the Korean War. Leading a patrol of 30 South Korean policemen into the village of Dangso-ri in October 1950, he came under heavy fire from the enemy entrenched in the village. Wilson led an attack on their stronghold and silenced it, but not before being struck down by a sniper’s bullet. He was awarded the Silver Star, and later inducted into the MI Hall of Fame. Wilson Barracks at Fort Huachuca is named for him. In the country’s next war, Vietnam, a number of intelligence NCOs lost their lives. Spec. Four James T. Davis was with the 3d Radio Research unit, advising elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam on 22 December 1961 when his team was ambushed by Viet Cong insurgents. After the truck in which he was riding was destroyed by a land mine, Davis returned fire, but was soon overrun and killed. He was the first American soldier to be killed in the Vietnam War.8 SSgt. Tony Bonilla, a member of the 746th MI Battalion, 470th MI Brigade, was awarded the Bronze Star during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama for his part in persuading the commanders of the Panamanian Defense Force to agree to a surrender, saving countless lives and the destruction of Panamanian towns. He was also instrumental in collecting intelligence on the whereabouts of Gen. Manuel Noriega and uncovering a large weapons cache. The list of those who have given their lives in the cause of their nation continues up through Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and into the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia called Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. It was there on 15 April 1994 that Sergeant First Class Benjamin T. Hodge, assigned to the Combined Task Force as an Arabic translator, met his death in a helicopter crash.

Hodge had been a intelligence soldier since 1979 and with the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, had served in Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, in Panama with the 519th MI Battalion during Operation JUST CAUSE, and again, as Senior Interrogator for the XVIII Airborne Corps Confinement Facility during the Gulf War. Hodge was inducted into the MI Hall of Fame in June 1997.

Let me present one final stalwart in the march of intelligence NCOs. Sgt. Roy Matsumoto was an intelligence sergeant in 1944 with the famed special operations unit called Merrill’s Marauders for its commander, Maj. Gen. Frank D. Merrill. Matsumoto had ample opportunity to demonstrate his ingenuity and dedication. High up in jungle trees, he tapped Japanese land lines with improvised equipment and listened in on their conversations, which the Japanese thought were secure because of the little known Kyushu dialect that they were using. By the rarest of coincidences, Matsumoto spoke and understood that dialect and was able to relay to his commander valuable intercepts.

Often, he would low-crawl to within hearing of Japanese positions and then return with a report on Japanese intentions. Once he caused the Japanese to rush unprepared into an American ambush by shouting “charge!” in his native tongue. The enemy suffered 54 fatal casualties while his unit sustained none. He was awarded the Legion of Merit for that escapade. But it was not the last time he would impersonate a Japanese officer. In April 1944 his unit was surrounded at Nhpum Ga, Burma, for ten days. At the end of the desperate siege, Matsumoto crawled into the formations of the Japanese attackers, jumped up and shrieked “Banzai,” launching a suicidal attack into the teeth of the Marauder’s defenses. His comrades could not believe his daring and credited their survival to Matsumoto’s initiative and courage. One of his fellows, Sgt. Warren T. Ventura, queried the commander, Lt. Col. George McGee, about why Matsumoto had not been put in for the Medal of Honor. McGee replied that “He was only an enlisted man doing his duty,” but some would say above and beyond.

It is true that Sgt. Roy Matsumoto, like all of those intelligence soldiers before and after him in history’s inexorable parade, was “only an enlisted man doing his duty.” It is how they approached their duty that set apart these men over the past two centuries of campaigning in the U.S. Army. Time and time again they have brought to each crisis an alert mind and a selfless determination, qualities which stamp them as intelligence NCOs.

1 Fishel, Edwin C., The Secret War for the Union: The

2 Fishel, p. 193.

3 Fishel, p. 287.

4 Fishel, p. 294.

5 Fishel, p. 307.

6 Fishel, p. 471.

